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Introduction
Disparities in economic well-being across the world are extreme. In sub-Saharan
Africa, over 40 percent of people live on less than $1.90 per day. In Burkina Faso
and Uganda – the contexts of this dissertation – per capita income is about $700,
less than 2 percent of per capita income in the average OECD country. Interna-
tional donors and developing-country governments often partner in response to
these substantial disparities, with donors transferring over $7 trillion in aid since
1947 (see aiddata.org). The intended beneficiaries of these efforts – citizens and
communities within recipient countries – are often lost in this process. This dis-
sertation refocuses directly on these intended beneficiaries, highlighting the unin-
tended political and economic consequences of top-down development.
Chapter 1 is motivated by the political implications of attempts to improve de-
velopment via the distribution of foreign aid projects in Africa. In societies in-
undated with these projects, I argue that citizens develop distinct preferences for
certain types of aid relative to others, favoring certain sectors, certain donors, and
certain implementation styles. While citizen preferences are important for “local
ownership” in the development process, theories of electoral accountability imply
that citizen preferences are also important for politically motivated recipient elites
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looking to maximize citizen support (e.g. De Kadt and Lieberman, 2017). Existing
research suggests that politicians and officials indeed consider the political impli-
cations of the distribution of aid, targeting projects towards select constituencies
(e.g. Jablonski, 2014; Briggs, 2014) and campaigning on delivering aid, even with-
out true claims to a project’s implementation (Cruz and Schneider, 2017). How-
ever, existing work rarely consults citizens directly, making evidence of whether
governments in fact respond to citizen preferences scant.
To fill this gap, I introduce a theoretical model in which citizen preferences de-
termine the optimal distribution of aid. I show that, once aggregated, these prefer-
ences imply the demand for each type of aid project, corresponding to the share of
aid that would be allocated towards each project if citizens were fully considered
by their government. I then estimate the demand for different types of aid projects
using a conjoint experiment fielded in Uganda, the results of which indicate that
citizen demand for social development projects like education and healthcare is
strong enough to outweigh concerns of government involvement and preferences
for specific donors. Comparing this demand to the observed distribution of aid
in recent years, the Ugandan government has substantially over-provided trans-
portation infrastructure. This suggests that the government likely values opportu-
nities for corruption (e.g. Winters and Martinez, 2015) and highly visible evidence
of development (e.g. Harding, 2015) more than responding to citizen demand.
Chapters 2 and 3 highlight how development decisions, often stemming from
joint efforts between international actors and domestic governments, produce un-
intended consequences. In Chapter 2, I focus on the unintended political impli-
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cations of internal displacement during civil war. I show how displacement in
Northern Uganda – prioritized by the Ugandan government but made possible by
international donors – altered the dynamics of vote buying after the displaced re-
turned to their homes. I again turn to experimental methods, this time to minimize
social desirability bias. Social desirability bias in this context stems from asking re-
spondents about selling their votes in previous elections, a practice that is both
illegal and social frowned upon. I use a variant of the randomized response ex-
periment, which relies on rolls of dice to provide cover for respondents answering
sensitive questions, ensuring that not even the survey enumerator knows a respon-
dent’s true answer. The results of this experiment show that returned internally
displaced peoples (IDPs) are more often targeted with vote buying than non-IDPs.
I argue that this effect is most consistent with the logic of internal displacement as a
severe economic shock, one that makes former IDPs more efficiently targeted than
non-IDPs. I suggest that this economic shock is due in large part to the removal of
IDPs from their land and difficulties regaining it post-displacement given informal
land tenure.
In Chapter 3, I shift to the unexpected economic consequences of reform in-
tended to improve development by bringing the government “closer to the peo-
ple”. I show that the creation of new government units in Burkina Faso – priori-
tized and funded by the international donors but implemented by the Burkinabe
government – resulted in perverse development outcomes for a substantial subset
of communities. This analysis again draws on experimental methods, though this
time with a hypothetical experiment in mind, one in which the Burkinabe govern-
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ment randomly allocated the creation of administrative units across the country.
Comparing development outcomes between communities that happened to be as-
signed a new unit with those that did not would therefore tell us something about
the causal effect of government fragmentation. Since an actual experiment would
be both impractical and unethical, I instead use a difference-in-differences design,
which approximates this experimental ideal by leveraging the repeated measure-
ment of local development outcomes before and after fragmentation.
This dissertation’s focus on the unintended consequences of development ef-
forts has led to very granular levels of analysis. In Chapters 1 and 2, the turn
to the voter-level implications of foreign aid and internal displacement requires
tailored voter-level data. To fill this gap, these chapters rely on original survey
data drawn from around 1,300 households across Northern Uganda.1 In Chapter
3, the emphasis on the community-level effects of government reform necessitates
community-level development data. The availability and quality of development
data across much of Africa, however, is poor, even at the country-level (Jerven,
2013). I turn to remote-sensed imagery of nighttime light intensity, sidestepping
this issue by measuring the provision of electricity from space.
Taken together, this dissertation suggests that development decisions must be
made with unintended consequences on the ground in mind. Like the political
implications of foreign aid distribution and internal displacement in Chapters 1
and 2, these consequences may be ostensibly unrelated to the initial goals of a
policy. In other cases, the consequences may be directly related but antithetical to
1University of Maryland-College Park IRB protocol 1220744-3
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a policy’s purpose, as in Chapter 3. While predicting unintended consequences
is more difficult than exploring them post-hoc, an understanding of the political-
economic incentives created by development decisions coupled with a keen focus
on context – be it post-conflict recovery and clientelistic political competition in
Northern Uganda or weak and unevenly distributed administrative capacity in
Burkina – will guide practitioners in the right direction.
5
1 The Demand for Aid
Abstract
Existing work suggests that recipient governments selectively allocate
their portfolio of aid projects to draw political support from their cit-
izens. This paper introduces a formal model that allows citizens to
hold heterogeneous preferences for aid projects along both cost and
non-cost dimensions, including the type of project, the donor, and the
level of recipient government involvement. The results of this model
indicate the politically optimal share of aid allocated to each type of aid
project given citizen demand. I then directly estimate the weight citi-
zens place on the theoretically specified cost and non-cost dimensions
of aid projects using an original conjoint experiment from around 1,300
respondents in Northern Uganda. These experimental weights enter
the formal model to estimate the demand for aid in Northern Uganda,
the results of which imply substantial political returns to allocating
social development projects and only slightly less demand for non-
traditional donors. Comparing equilibrium demand to the observed
distribution of aid in the region, the Ugandan government has substan-
tially over-provided Western-funded transportation projects.
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Prevailing perspectives on foreign aid suggest an important role for citizen pref-
erences. Donors operate within the paradigm of “local ownership”, with citizen
engagement often stated as crucial for effective development.1 Beyond effective-
ness, existing work suggests that the implications of electoral accountability mo-
tivate the distribution of aid, with recipient governments allocating a larger share
of aid to important political constituencies (e.g. Jablonski, 2014; Briggs, 2014) and
local politicians campaigning on the successful delivery of projects demanded by
their voters (e.g. Cruz and Schneider, 2017). Yet academic work rarely focuses on
the preferences of recipient citizens. As such, we lack a theoretical framework for
conceptualizing these preferences, evidence regarding what these preferences look
like, and evidence regarding how well recipient governments target the projects
demanded by their voters.
This paper seeks to address these gaps, making three principle contributions.
First, I specify a model which captures the stylized context in which a recipient
government is fully accountable to citizen preferences for aid. Absent unlim-
ited access to aid, targeting aid towards one type of project necessitates limiting
investment elsewhere. The government must therefore define a portfolio of aid
projects that balances the heterogeneous preferences of their citizens with limited
resources. I use a formal model and computational algorithm to simulate a solu-
tion to this dilemma, the results of which indicate the optimal share of aid targeted
1The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, follows a
framework in which “Inclusive country ownership means that development priorities are estab-
lished in ways that are broadly responsive to citizen needs and aspirations. Inclusive country
systems also recognize that all parts of society – certainly governments, but also civil society, the
private sector, universities and individual citizens—have important resources, ideas and energy
that are essential to sustaining development” (USAID, 2014, p. 3).
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towards each type of project given citizen demand.
Second, I estimate citizen preferences for different types of aid projects via a
conjoint experiment fielded in Northern Uganda from around 1,300 households.
Whereas existing applications have used conjoint experiments for understanding
individual-level political preferences, this paper offers a unique extension to the
provision of development projects.2 Results from this experiment show that Ugan-
dan voters are sensitive to project cost, the type of aid provided, and the donor
partner, but not the level of recipient government involvement in the project.
Third, I combine the conjoint estimates with the formal model to estimate cit-
izen demand for 72 different configurations of aid projects in Northern Uganda.
The results of this optimal choice problem indicate what the distribution of aid
would look like if the Ugandan government defined an aid portfolio in the con-
text of full citizen accountability. Constrained by their voters, the Ugandan gov-
ernment could maximize support by distributing social development projects –
specifically, projects targeting healthcare, education, and water supply – funded
by Western donors. However, citizens only slightly prefer Western donors over
non-Western donors like China and Japan once accounting for the sector targeted.
I then explore the degree to which the Ugandan government responds to cit-
izen demand in practice by comparing the model estimates to the observed dis-
tribution of aid over the last decade. Relative to citizen demand, the Ugandan
2Conjoint experiments have been recently used to estimate citizen preferences for types of immi-
grants (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015), politicians (Carlson, 2015), policy preferences (Horiuchi
et al., 2018), and perceptions of terrorism (Huff and Kertzer, 2018). In an application most substan-
tively related to this paper, Heinrich and Kobayashi (2018) present a conjoint design estimating
preferences for the provision of foreign aid to different types of regimes from the perspective of
citizens in donor countries.
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government has substantially over-invested in roads funded by Western donors.
This over-provision suggests that the opportunities for corruption that often fol-
low large-scale infrastructure likely outweigh the potential electoral costs of slight-
ing voter preferences (Winters and Martinez, 2015). These projects may also be
over-provided because they are more “visible”, increasing the likelihood voters
attribute the delivery of aid to incumbent politicians (Harding, 2015). Perhaps
counterintuitively, the results also show that the Ugandan government has over-
provided healthcare projects from Western donors and under-provided all projects
from non-Western donors. These findings underscore the importance of consider-
ing relative demand as a function of total spending rather than baseline preferences
alone and suggest that the over-provision of specific types of aid runs counter to
the general demand for a diverse set of donors and projects.
By refocusing on citizen demand for projects, this paper challenges existing un-
derstandings of the politics of aid. Previous work on aid at the individual level un-
derstates the importance of project type in driving citizen preferences for projects
(Findley et al., 2017a). By contrast, I show that citizens in fact exhibit strong prefer-
ences for different types of projects, with social development projects substantially
preferred to infrastructure projects. Additionally, though recent work at more ag-
gregate levels of analysis has suggested that Chinese aid is particularly suscep-
tible to elite corruption and political manipulation (Dreher et al., 2016; Isaksson
and Kotsadam, 2018), the results presented here imply that citizens are similarly
averse to non-Western donors in general, including Japan, and to a lesser extent,
the African Development Bank. This suggests that the perceptual differences be-
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tween donors are more important than material differences in their donor ability to
implement successful projects. Finally, citizens were almost entirely unresponsive
to variation in levels of involvement by their recipient government in the imple-
mentation of aid projects. This result is particularly important in the context of
existing evidence, which suggests that citizens prefer aid projects relative to gov-
ernment projects because of perceptions of corruption (Findley et al., 2017a; Milner
et al., 2016).
1.1 Modeling the Demand for Aid
This section models the optimal allocation of aid projects as a function of citizen
preferences, adapting the utility functions and equilibrium conditions from Are-
noe et al. (2015). In a stylized context, citizen-level preferences may be used to in-
form the behavior of the key decision-makers that design and allocate aid projects
– donors and recipient governments. Consider the scenario in which a recipient
government seeks to decide how much aid to allocate towards different types of
projects and from which donors. Simplifying to only two types of projects, q and
j, this goal may defined as optimizing
Rq = DMq(Pq|Pj, Xq, Xj)Pq, (1.1)
where Rq is the total return to implementing project q when project cost is Pq and
the non-cost attributes are Xq. Non-cost attributes include all descriptive qualities
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of a project, like the sector targeted and the donor. Similarly, Pj and Xj captures
the cost and non-cost attributes for project j, respectively. Total demand for foreign
aid projects is represented by the constant D, while the share of aid – referred to
throughout as “aid share” – of project spending directed towards project q is Mq.
The intuition of Equation 1.1 is that the share of aid allocated towards project q
varies as a function of not only its own attributes, but also as a function of the
attributes of project j.
I assume that the recipient government and donors are concerned with maxi-
mizing citizen utility when defining an aid portfolio. This is not to say that donors
and recipients behave this way in reality; there are various reasons to believe that
they do not. For example, elites within recipient governments are often decried for
looking out for their own interests rather than the interests of their citizenry (see
Moyo, 2009, among many others). Citizens may also fail to be heard by donors (e.g.
Gibson et al., 2005) and donors often fail to coordinate their efforts (e.g. Easterly,
2007).
Yet this modeling assumption is a particularly useful one – it allows for the
identification of what the distribution of aid would look like if donors and re-
cipients did respond to citizen demand, a baseline which can then be compared
with the observed distribution of aid (see Section 1.4.3). From an international
development perspective, this corresponds to building a model with “local own-
ership” from the perspective of citizens at its core, therefore capturing a key tenant
of the current aid effectiveness paradigm.3 From a political theory perspective, this
3Ownership was enshrined in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which was signed
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assumption corresponds to the implications of full electoral accountability in the
context of the public goods provision (e.g. De Kadt and Lieberman, 2017). Existing
work on the subnational politics of aid suggests that recipient politicians and of-
ficials indeed consider electoral implications when distributing aid, allocating aid
towards electorally valuable constituencies in Ghana (Briggs, 2012), India (Nun-
nenkamp et al., 2017), and Kenya (Briggs, 2014; Jablonski, 2014). Local politicians
also campaign on the delivery of aid projects, even in cases in which they have no
credible connection to the project’s allocation or implementation (Cruz and Schnei-
der, 2017).
The assumption is therefore that recipient governments derive returns from






βikXkq + AiPq, (1.2)
where Uiq is the utility citizen i derives from project q with K attributes. The weight
Ai is the disulity associated with the cost of a project for citizen i. The non-cost
attribute k is present in project q when Xk=1. The utility associated with attribute
k for citizen i is captured by the parameter βik. The parameters Ai and βik are
indexed by citizen, allowing for the disutility associated with project cost and the
utility attached to each project attribute to vary across individuals and therefore
groups of interest. Following work in economics and optimal product design (e.g.
by over 100 countries and donors. Subsequent agreements like the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action
further pushed the importance of country and local ownership for aid effectiveness.
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McFadden, 1973, 1986; Arenoe et al., 2015), the citizen-level choice problem may
be operationalized as




with citizen i preferring project q if and only if Uiq + εiq > Uij + εij. By consider-






where Mq is the share of aid allocated towards project q given citizen preferences
that afford maximum returns.
1.1.1 The dimensions of aid demand
This section makes explicit the cost and several non-cost dimensions of aid projects
that drive variation in Uiq and therefore Mq.4 Importantly, while some preferences
may be driven by tangible factors (e.g. the need for certain types of development
rather than others), this need not be the case. Perhaps more important are the less
tangible factors like perceptions of donor and/or government competence.5 In the
following sections, I describe the material and perceptual concerns that are likely
4While I draw on existing work to identify these dimensions, the model is general enough to
incorporate any set of dimensions that may be important in a given application.
5The importance of perceptions here is analogous to the valence dimension in common spatial
models of voting (e.g. Adams et al., 2005).
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important.
How much will the project cost?
The first dimension of the demand for aid is project cost. While “aid” implies
that donors will fund all or most of a project, this need not be the case. To be
considered foreign aid, the grant portion of a project’s funding must total at least
25 percent, but donors and recipients have significant bargaining room regarding
how the rest of the funding will be comprised.6 At one extreme, a project may be
entirely a grant, with no expectation that the recipient will bear any cost. For other
projects, beyond the 25 percent grant component, recipients may receive loans –
concessionary or otherwise – from development finance institutions or may agree
to fund portions of a project directly from their own coffers. Some aid projects also
require “in-kind contributions” in which recipient communities provide inputs to
a project, like labor or supplies rather than direct financial support.
Previous work at the microlevel has considered the issue of project cost as only
tangentially important from the perspective of citizens. For example, Findley et al.
(2017a) conducted a survey experiment in which government elites and normal
Ugandan citizens were randomly assigned either government spending or foreign
aid projects. All respondents were prompted that projects “may require your com-
munity to provide funding” prior to eliciting responses. According to the authors,
this priming was necessary since “...aid may be perceived as ‘free money’ whereas
6The OECD defines official development assistance (ODA) as “Flows of official financing ad-
ministered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries
as the main objective, and which are concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25
percent.”
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government programs may imply increased taxes” introducing concern that “...of-
fering a project without any noted costs might lead all subjects to support it” (Find-
ley et al., 2017a, p. 644). To confirm that perceptions of cost did not bias their
main results, Findley et al. (2017a) randomly assigned the cost prompt to half of
their sample in a smaller follow-up study, the results of which indicated that the
perceptions of cost were an unimportant predictor of citizen preferences for aid
projects over government spending. The authors suggest that this null result is
likely due to the nature of taxation Uganda: many Ugandans are not subject to an
income tax because they earn too little; many citizens also avoid indirect taxation
because they operate outside of the formal economy. Government projects and aid
projects may both therefore be perceived as “free” by survey respondents because
most Ugandan citizens do not directly contribute to their funding.
While Findley et al. (2017a) address the issue of project cost primarily for rea-
sons of internal validity, I argue that it is a fundamentally important component
of project design because of its implications for recipient citizens. Conceding that
citizens in developing countries may not internalize project cost through a taxa-
tion mechanism, I suggest that, all else equal, citizens are incentivized to prefer
lower cost to higher cost projects for at least two reasons. First, governments are
constrained in their ability to internally fund development projects; if not, there
would be no need to seek foreign aid. This budget constraint implies that, as
the share of development projects funded directly by recipient countries increases,
the available resources to fund additional projects falls. Second, and relatedly,
a cash-strapped recipient government may instead rely on financing to fund the
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non-grant portion of an aid project. Taking on external debt, however, is nega-
tively associated with economic growth and public expenditure, implying that the
negative externalities of this option will permeate down to average citizens (e.g.
Nguyen et al., 2003). The empirical expectation is therefore that citizens should
prefer lower cost (i.e. a larger grant component) to higher cost projects; in the
language of the model, the parameter Ai should be negative.
What is the good?
The first non-cost dimension of aid demand is project type. In the most trivial
sense, if citizens do not perceive a need for a particular good, it is unlikely that
citizens will demand a project delivering such a good. However, in many aid-
dependent countries, a weak provision of nearly all public goods implies that the
intended output from most types of aid projects would fill some need. The ques-
tion then becomes: given that many types of public goods and services are needed,
what types of aid projects do citizens prioritize and why?7
The answer to this question requires a consideration of not only the intended
output of a project, but also the perceived likelihood that the intended output will
be realized. Existing work suggests that recipient capture is perhaps the most im-
portant barrier to aid project success in the developing world. Van de Walle (2001,
p, 208) describes how projects were often manipulated by African elites for private
gain in the 1980s to the detriment of successful development:
7Findley et al. (2017a, p. 544) make a similar comment regarding their finding that project type
appeared unimportant in their Ugandan sample, stating that this “...may reflect the fact that both
types of projects are desperately sought after in Uganda.”
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Government officials came to view donor resources as a series of free
excludable benefits to be appropriated: the project vehicle, the cash for
operating expenses, the ‘sitting fees’ to attend meetings and so on...
Project jobs, fellowships, housing, cars, and various types of procure-
ment were often doled out on the basis of family, ethnicity, or political
affiliation rather than merit.
In some cases, local officials divert aid funds into private coffers. For example,
Reinikka and Svensson (2005) show that over 85 percent of education funding in
Uganda between 1991 and 1995 was captured by government officials and political
elites. Projects may also be subject to more indirect diversion as well through ma-
nipulation of the bidding and procurement process. In a well known case, Olken
(2007) estimated that the reported expenditures on road projects in Indonesia were
on average 24 percent higher than actual costs, with this excess kicked back to local
elites.
This type of corruption and political capture is not equally probable across all
types of aid projects or for the provision of public goods more generally (e.g. Kra-
mon and Posner, 2013). Large infrastructure projects, like the construction of roads
and electrification grids, are known to be prone to both large scale capture and
petty corruption. By contrast, social development projects, like those aimed at im-
proving education and health outcomes, are less susceptible to these issues. To
Winters and Martinez (2015, p. 519), “As compared to monitoring the costs and
quality of input in a large infrastructure project, it is somewhat easier to monitor
the delivery of medicines or vaccines in a health sector project or the provision of
teachers or textbooks in an education sector project.” Social development projects
often have programmatic properties – the rules of distribution are known, public,
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and enforced (Stokes et al., 2013). For example, beneficiaries of donor-sponsored
programs like Progresa/Oportunidades in Mexico were selected on the basis of spe-
cific measures of need. According to Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2016), the reliance on
this selection criteria greatly reduced the ability of the government to leverage its
own discretion in allocating project benefits, which, in turn, limited the potential
for project capture and ensured a wide distribution of benefits. The implication
of this work is therefore that citizens likely prefer social development projects to
infrastructure projects.
Who is the donor?
The second non-cost dimension influencing aid demand comes from variation
across donors. The weak provision of public goods in many developing coun-
tries suggests that citizens likely support a wide swath of donor activity. The key
consideration, therefore, is what types of donors are perceived as most competent
in achieving their stated developmental purposes. The importance of this dimen-
sion hinges on the assumption that citizens are at least minimally aware of what
donor is providing a given development project. Efforts by donors to “brand”
their projects bolsters the validity of this assumption. According to Dietrich et al.
(2018), donors often construct signs to convey their role in a development project
to recipient citizens. In Section 1.2, I describe the presence of such branding in the
empirical context of this paper.
There are two likely sources of variation in citizen perceptions of donor compe-
tence. First, existing research at the country-level has shown important variation
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between bilateral and multilateral donors, which may in turn influence citizen per-
ceptions of effectiveness. Bilateral aid – which flows from a single country – is of-
ten allocated for political-strategic purposes, rather than for development per se.
In some cases, friendly donors may even distribute aid specifically to “prop up”
a recipient incumbent (Licht, 2010). To the dismay of the average citizen, bilateral
donors may actually prefer that recipient elites capture aid to their own political
advantage.
Multilateral donors include development institutions that are funded by multi-
ple countries, like the World Bank and European Union, as well as regional devel-
opment institutions like the African Development Bank, the Asian Development
Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America. Unlike bilateral donors, mul-
tilateral institutions aggregate the political preferences of several actors, reducing
the likelihood that any one country will be able to reflect its own political-strategic
goals in the distribution of aid (Martens et al., 2002). Because multilateral donors
are at least partially more divorced from using aid as a political tool, Milner (2006)
argues that they are better able to fulfill their development mandate. Though they
find only minimal evidence of variation in citizen preferences for multilateral ver-
sus bilateral donors, Findley et al. (2017b) suggests that the average Ugandan sees
multilateral donors as more trustworthy and transparent than their bilateral coun-
terparts. The empirical expectation is therefore that citizens likely prefer multilat-
eral to bilateral aid projects.
Second, existing perspectives suggest that perceptions of donor competence
likely vary between “traditional” Western donors and China. As the most signifi-
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cant non-Western donor in Africa, the Chinese and their approach to development
assistance has received an increasing amount of attention. Dreher et al. (2016) re-
fer to the Chinese model as “demand-driven” – recipient governments make some
request for potential development assistance and if the Chinese choose to fund
the project, they do so without attaching conditions. This approach is derived
from China’s policy of “non-interference,” avoiding interjections in the domestic
politics of foreign countries (Brautigam, 2009). Some argue that this approach is
especially sensitive to recipient capture. Tull summarizes this view:
Chinese aid tends to benefit the governments of receiving countries
more directly than the policies of Western donors, who are preoccu-
pied with the reduction of poverty. The Chinese, unlike Western coun-
tries, finance grandiose and prestigious buildings (presidential palaces,
football stadiums) that African leaders highly appreciate for their own
political reasons (Tull, 2006, p. 467).
Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018) show that this effect reaches average citizens, with
perceptions of local corruption increasing near Chinese aid projects, while percep-
tions of corruption appear unaffected by World Bank projects. The implication of
this discussion is therefore that citizens likely prefer non-Chinese aid to Chinese
aid. Recent evidence has begun pushing back on the “rogue donor” narrative sur-
rounding Chinese aid. For example, African citizens tend to see Chinese assistance
as beneficial (see round 6 of the Afrobarometer). Of those aware of Chinese aid, 71
percent of East Africans, 73 percent of West Africans, and 53 percent of Southern
Africans surveyed view it as doing somewhat or a very good job. Using both ob-
servational and experimental evidence, Blair and Roessler (2018) find that Chinese
aid has little-to-no influence on citizen perceptions of their government. In the
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experimental design, I contribute to adding nuance to this debate my including
several other non-Western donors in addition to China.
Is the government involved?
The final non-cost dimension is the level of recipient government involvement.
Aid projects fall on a spectrum from minimal to substantial government involve-
ment. Beginning at the minimal end, donors may attempt to deliver aid to citi-
zens without channeling through recipient government institutions. This strategy
– known as “bypass aid” – is often used when recipient governments are deemed
corrupt or incompetent (Dietrich, 2013). Bypass aid projects may be either imple-
mented directly by the donor or through NGOs. At the other end of the spectrum,
donors channel the implementation of other aid projects through recipient govern-
ment institutions.
Existing evidence suggests that citizens likely prefer only minimal government
involvement. For example, Winters et al. (2017) show that citizens exposed to in-
formation that the United States funded a development project in Bangladesh were
more likely to perceive the project as successful than those without this informa-
tion. Further, absent donor involvement, political actors often make dynamically
inconsistent bargains that result in project incompletion (Williams, 2017). The pref-
erence for donor-led projects is likely magnified for in the context of widespread
perceptions of corruption. The average Ugandan, for example, is more likely to
prefer an aid project to a government project if they view the government as cor-
rupt (Findley et al., 2017a). The implication is that citizens likely prefer limited to
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substantial government involvement.
1.1.2 Equilibrium citizen demand
The previous section has described how citizen demand for aid projects likely
varies given different levels of project cost and configurations of non-cost project
attributes. As specified in Equation 1.1, the government must consider how the
allocation of aid towards one type of project shifts how much aid they can provide
towards other projects. This implies that each project has a Nash equilibrium aid
share, where changing the share of aid targeted towards a project cannot improve
overall returns given the share of aid allocated towards all other projects. In the
two project case, equilibrium positions are found by differentiating the return to












+ Mj(Pq|Pj, Xq, Xj) = 0 (1.6)
Mapping the citizen-level utility functions in Equation 1.2 to these derivatives and
generalizing to all Q projects (Q ≥ 2, suppressing i subscripts for each citizen),
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∑Kk=1 βkXkq + APq
) = 0, ∀ q ∈ Q. (1.7)
To illustrate the implications of this model, I simulate data on 198 citizens, each
of which are sensitive to the cost and non-cost dimensions of aid projects described
above. The cost disutility parameter Ai is drawn from a normal distribution with a
mean of -0.01 for each citizen and a standard deviation small enough to ensure that
all prefer lower cost projects.8 As depicted in Figure 1.1, there are two levels per
non-cost attribute. As with the cost parameter, the weight each citizen attaches to
a level being present in a given project – βi,k – is drawn from a multivariate normal
distribution, the mean of which is defined in the table in Figure 1.1.
In this setup, there are 2x2x2 = 8 total projects available for the government to
choose from. To estimate equilibrium aid shares, I use a computational algorithm
that iteratively solves for the optimal aid share for each project given the shares of
all others. This algorithm draws mostly from Arenoe et al. (2015), who model a
market for hotels in the context of price and non-price competition and Calvo and
Murillo (2019), who model electoral competition when parties make both policy
and non-policy offers to voters.9
8 Ai ∼ (−0.01, 0.001).
9In Arenoe et al. (2015), the authors use only the average preference and cost disutility in their
functions. By contrast, I define a preference set and cost disutility for each citizen, though drawn
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Consider the case where citizens view all projects similarly. The weight the
average citizen attaches to each level is shown in Figure 1.1 as Homogeneous pref-
erences. The utility the average citizen associates with both levels within each at-
tribute is the same. Figure 1.1 plots the equilibrium aid shares for all 8 projects.
Intuitively, the optimal aid share for the entire menu of projects converges towards
0.125 (18 ) and equilibrium cost collapses to the median, though cost is not plotted in
this example. Given homogeneous cost and non-cost preferences, donors and the
recipient government may therefore design an aid portfolio that maximizes citizen
support by directing an equal share of assistance towards all projects.
Figure 1.1: Equilibrium aid shares with simulated data
A general contention of this paper, however, is that citizens attach heteroge-
neous weights to the different dimensions of aid projects. For simplicity, I allow
from the same distribution as in Calvo and Murillo (2019). The R code implementing this algorithm
may be found in the Appendix.
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one level within each attribute to be twice as preferred by the average citizen as
the alternative level. These weights are depicted under Heterogeneous preferences in
Figure 1.1. Movement in equilibrium positions when shifting from homogeneous
to heterogeneous weights is shown by the lines and arrows emanating from the
homogeneous equilibrium positions. The primary result of this exercise is that
the most strongly preferred projects crowd out the lesser preferred projects in aid
share. Note that the sum utility derived from even the least preferred project, I-Y-
H, remains identical to its sum utility in the homogeneous case, yet because this
total utility relative to the total utility of the other projects has decreased, its aid
share equilibrium has also decreased.
While this section has illustrated the mechanics of estimating equilibrium aid
shares, a key contribution of this model is that each theoretical parameter is es-
timable via survey-experimental data. The next section describes the context in
which this approach is implemented.
1.2 Foreign Aid in Northern Uganda
This study focuses on estimating the demand for aid in Northern Uganda. This
is a particularly important case for at least two reasons. First, Uganda is one of
the most aid-dependent countries in the world. As of 2016, the country’s ODA
to government spending ratio – a common measure of aid dependence – totaled
over 0.53; only four non-island states in the world exhibit more severe aid de-
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pendence.10 Second, donors have widely touted Uganda as a model aid recipi-
ent. Since taking power in 1986, President Museveni has been willing to concede
to many donor conditions. However, these concessions have tended to revolve
around economic liberalization, while political change has been scarce (Englebert
and Tull, 2008). In fact, Museveni and other Ugandan elites have successfully
leveraged foreign aid to maintain patronage networks, ensuring the political sur-
vival of the current regime (Mwenda and Tangri, 2005). Ugandan aid has also
been subject to notable corruption. In recent years, for example, the Prime Min-
ister managed to graft around e12 million from the Irish and a few Scandinavian
countries.11 In 2018, for example, government officials were caught manipulat-
ing refugee numbers in order to coax more aid from the UN and the European
Union.12 While aid has been subject to both political and economic capture by
Ugandan elites, the benefits of aid for the average Ugandan citizen are unclear.
This has created what Jones (2009) refers to as “two Ugandas:” one dominated
by development practitioners and government elites, and another occupied by the
vast majority of citizens, most of whom see the donor activity yet rarely feel any
progress.
Though the entire country is dependent on aid, I focus on Northern Uganda
because it has been particularly inundated with donor activity in over the last
decade.13 This influx is largely attributable to post-conflict development efforts
10In order of highest to lowest ODA to government spending ratio, these countries are Malawi,
Rwanda, Mali, and Burkina Faso (see oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline).
11See transparency.org/news/feature/aid_robbed_in_uganda_what_can_be_done.
12See https://dailym.ai/2zqBRM8.
13This discussion draws on interviews conducted with several government officials and military
officers in Northern Uganda in June of 2018.
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following the decades-long insurgency of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The
LRA terrorized almost the entire Northern half of Uganda between the late 1980s
and 2006, when the rebels were pushed out of the country. Beginning in 1996,
northerners were forcefully displaced into internal displacement camps. By 2003,
nearly all rural northerners inhabited IDP camps (Branch, 2009). Donors were ac-
tive during the insurgency, providing humanitarian assistance to sustain the in-
ternally displaced population. However, investment in more general types of de-
velopment came to a halt, leaving the North substantially behind the rest of the
country.
After the insurgency waned, donors took root in the North – primarily in the
town of Gulu – and turned towards post-conflict reconstruction projects. Between
2009 and 2016, over 500 foreign aid projects were implemented.14 Shown in Figure
1.2, every northern district received at least some attention from donors, though
projects indeed concentrated around Gulu, the district with the most projects over
this time period. Some of the largest projects include a Japanese funded rural
electrification project, a Chinese funded roads project, World Bank funded roads
and electrification projects, and United States funded healthcare and civil society
projects.
The saturation of development activity in Northern Uganda is highly visible to
the surrounding citizens. On seemingly every corner, a sign describes some cur-
rent or former aid project, outlining at a minimum the donor and the goal of the
14Since many foreign aid projects are divided into sub-projects and operate at multiple locations,
“project” here refers more precisely to “project-location”. This data from from AidData’s 1.4.1
release for Uganda (AidData, 2016).
27








Note: The aid project data comes from Uganda’s AIMS made available from AidData. The high-
lighted districts are those from which the sample was drawn.
project. In some cases, even implementing contractors and intended beneficiaries
are outlined.15 The streets are also lined with gated donor and NGO offices. More-
over, the implementation of many projects is visible to the public. For example,
it is common to see Japanese foremen – with helmets and clothes signifying that
they are in fact Japanese aid workers – overseeing local laborers constructing new
roads within Gulu. Citizens appear to have internalized much information from
15See the Appendix for a representative example of such signs.
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this saturation, with focus groups in Gulu able to list dozens of donors, NGOs, and
active or former aid projects without guidance (see Figure 1.12 for three lists put
together independently by three groups of participants).
1.3 Survey and experimental design
This section introduces the experimental design used to estimate the weight citi-
zens in Northern Uganda attach to the cost and non-cost dimensions of aid projects.
In June of 2018, a team of enumerators implemented the survey in four districts in
Northern Uganda (see Appendix Figure 1.10). Three of these districts – Amuru,
Gulu, and Kitgum – are from the Acholi-speaking subregion of the North, while
Arua is within the West Nile subregion and made up of primarily Lugbara speak-
ers.
Sampling followed a multistaged strategy, with subcounties, parishes, and ul-
timately polling stations within each district randomly selected from a complete
list. Enumerators used a random-walk pattern to sample households and respon-
dents were stratified by gender. In total, the survey reach over 1,300 households,
with 1,281 individuals successfully completing all modules. Depicted in Figure
1.3, which shows the characteristics of the sample, around 60 percent of the sam-
ple was drawn from the Acholi districts, while the remaining 40 percent came from
the West Nile district of Arua. These sampling proportions correspond generally
to the population levels within each district.16
16According to the 2014 census, the population of Arua District is around 782,000, while the
population totals for Gulu, Kitgum, and Amuru Districts are around 276,000, 204,000, and 187,000,
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1.3.1 Conjoint attributes and levels
This paper focuses on the conjoint experiment embedded within this survey in
which respondents were repeatedly shown pairs of aid projects and instructed to
state their preferred choice within each pair. Projects were randomly assigned fea-
tures that differed across four attributes – the project type, the donor, the level of
government involvement, and cost. Project attributes were randomly assigned one
of several levels, which Table 1.1 summarizes and I detail below.
respectively.
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The first attribute – Project – captures variation in project type. This attribute
takes six possible values: 1) electrification; 2) roads; 3) piped water supply; 4)
healthcare; 5) education; and 6) conflict mitigation. These levels were selected
for two reasons. First, these levels reasonably proxy the spectrum between infras-
tructure and social development projects. On one end, the electrification and roads
project unambiguously reference traditional infrastructure investment, while health-
care, education, and conflict mitigation reference social development projects. De-
pending on interpretation, piped water supply may fall somewhere between in-
frastructure and social development. Focus group participants, for example, gen-
erally viewed piped water supply as very related to health outcomes, therefore
suggesting that it may be interpreted more towards the social end of the spectrum,
though there are clear infrastructural elements as well. Second, these projects are
generally representative of the most common types of development projects in
Uganda (see Figure 1.4). I expect the healthcare, education, and conflict mitigation
projects (social development) to be preferred to the infrastructure projects (electrifi-
cation and roads), while piped water supply should fall somewhere in the middle.
The second attribute is the Donor, which takes five possible levels: 1) the African
Development Bank; 2) the World Bank; 3) the United States; 4) China; and 5) Japan.
Like the Project attribute, these levels were selected because they both represent
common donors and are differentiable in conceptually important ways (see Figure
1.4). First, there are three multilateral donors (the African Development Bank, the
EU, and the World Bank) and three bilateral donors (China, Japan, and the USA).
Following the second empirical expectation, the multilateral donors should be pre-
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Each block worth $250 million
African Development Bank total ~= $127,000,000
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ferred to the bilateral donors. Second, this collection of donors allows for testing
the rogue-China hypothesis, which suggests that citizens should prefer all other
sources of aid to the Chinese.
The third attribute is Government Involvement. For simplicity, this attribute takes
only two potential levels: 1) minimal and 2) substantial. I expect minimal govern-
ment involvement to be preferred to substantial government involvement. The
final attribute is Project Cost, taking three possible values: 1) zero; 2) 10 percent;
and 3) 30 percent. The zero level represents an aid project that is entirely a grant,
while 10 percent and 30 percent capture varying degrees of costs borne by the re-
cipient. The expectation is that citizens will prefer low cost to higher cost projects.



















1.3.2 Experimental implementation and estimation strategy
Because conjoint experiments require a substantial amount of randomization, they
are typically implemented electronically with the help of online survey applica-
tions like Qualtrics. Contexts without widespread and reliable internet access
make these online options impractical. The survey was therefore implemented us-
ing Qualtrics offline application on mobile tablets. Conjoint randomization, how-
ever, is not accessible offline through standard Qualtrics offerings. To get around
this limitation, I modify the JavaScript code detailed by Meyer and Rosenzweig
(2016), which directly embeds instructions for conjoint randomization within the
survey code, making it possible to implement this design absent internet access.
Survey enumerators introduced the conjoint module with the following vi-
gnette:
Your government and other organizations will likely have to choose
between a number of development projects to start in your region. I’m
going to present you with a number of paired projects. Tell me which
project in each pair you would prefer.
Enumerators then verbally described project pairings to respondents. For exam-
ple, after reading the above vignette, the enumerator would state:
Would you prefer:
Project A: A World Bank project with Minimal Government Involve-
ment for the development of Roads in which communities like your
own would contribute 10 percent of the project’s total cost.
OR
Project B: A Chinese project with Minimal Government Involvement
for the development of Education in which communities like you own
would contribute none of the project’s total cost.
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Enumerators were instructed to repeat project pairings if necessary to ensure that
respondents understood the options.
The experimental design closely follows the recommendations in Hainmueller
et al. (2014). Project attributes were fully randomized within each round, while
attribute orderings were randomized across respondents. These design choices
imply that project assignment is completely independent and that there should be
no profile order effects on average, therefore satisfying key assumptions necessary
for the nonparametric identification of marginal effects. Respondents participated
in a maximum of six rounds. Recent work has found little evidence of survey satis-
ficing with up to 30 choice tasks, a number well above the maximum applied here
(Bansak et al., 2018). In rare cases, project pairs within a single round were iden-
tical across all attributes. Given identical projects, enumerators were instructed to
simply move on to the next round or survey module if on the sixth round.
The causal quantities of interest are average marginal effects (AMEs), defined
as the marginal effect of a given attribute averaged over the joint distribution of all
other attributes (Hainmueller et al., 2014, p. 10). AMEs therefore correspond to the
weight citizens attach to different components of aid projects. AMEs are estimated
nonparametrically via the ANOVA strategy described by Egami and Imai (2018)
and implemented in the FindIt R package (Egami et al., 2018). While baseline
AMEs are also estimable via linear regression (Hainmueller et al., 2014), I prefer the
ANOVA approach because it allows for machine learning extensions for collapsing




I first present baseline average marginal effects (AMEs) from the conjoint experi-
ment. Figure 1.5 plots AMEs when using the full sample. All AMEs are interpreted
relative to the baseline within their attribute category, which is centered at zero.
AMEs indicate the change in the probability that the average respondent would
prefer a project profile if a given attribute was changed from the baseline level to
the level of interest. For example, the AME for the United States is around 0.07,
implying that if a project’s donor was switched from Japan to the United States,
the average respondent would be around 7 percentage points more likely to pre-
fer the project. The order of levels within each attribute is fixed across all plots to
facilitate comparison.
The least preferred Donor is Japan, though the AME for China is not statisti-
cally distinguishable from Japan’s. The “traditional” Western donors, by contrast,
are more strongly preferred to Japan; the average respondent is between 3.75 per-
centage points to 7.0 percentage points more likely to prefer aid from the EU, the
World Bank, or the US than Japan. Respondents also relatively prefer the African
Development Bank, with a precisely estimated AME implying that respondents
are around 3.0 percentage points more likely to choose an African Development
Bank project than a Japanese project.
Respondents are most sensitive to the Project attribute, with Electrification be-
ing significantly less preferred to all other levels. Healthcare projects, the most
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preferred level, are estimated to be around 35 percentage points more likely to
be chosen than Electrification projects. Education and Water Supply projects are
also very strongly preferred, with both around 26 percentage points more likely
to be selected than Electrification projects. Finally, Roads and Conflict Mitigation
projects are around 8 and 11 percentage points more likely to be preferred relative
to Electrification, respectively.
Participants were also highly sensitive to project Cost. Relative to a costless
project, a project in which the community would be expected to contribute to 10
percent of the project’s cost is over 6 percentage points less likely to be chosen.
When cost increases to 30 percent, the project is 15 percentage points less likely to
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be chosen.
Turning to the final attribute, substantial Government Involvement is slightly less
preferred to minimal involvement, though this estimate is not distinguishable from
zero. Importantly, this null effect appears unrelated to measurement error since it
is precisely estimated (standard error = 0.008). Instead, Government Involvement
alone is likely unpredictive of citizen preferences when considering the multidi-
mensionality of aid projects.
1.4.1 A manipulation check
The context of underdevelopment and donor activity suggests an important threat
to the validity of these results. Namely, respondents may have been tempted to
provide answers that they assume correspond donor preferences. If these assumed
donor preferences deviate from the respondents’ true preferences, the estimated
effects will be biased.
To address this threat, I rely on a survey question that asks respondents how
strongly they agree or disagree (five-point scale) with the statement that the Ugan-
dan government should pursue more foreign aid. Respondents that strongly want
more foreign aid are likely those that would be the most susceptible to biasing their
responses towards assumed donor preferences. I therefore compare the subset of
respondents that strongly want more aid (around 46 percent of the full sample and
the modal response) with those that do not strongly want more aid. Figure 1.6 plots
these estimates. The similarity in estimates between groups suggests that there is
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likely little bias from respondents pandering to assumed donor preferences.
Figure 1.6: Manipulation check: average marginal effects for those that do not
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−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Estimate
Strongly agree: Uganda should pursue more aid
N = 6,920
1.4.2 Regularization
I now turn to the penalized ANOVA approach described in Egami and Imai (2018).
I leverage this approach here to collapse like-factors into groups within conjoint
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levels. Collapsing factors in this way is valuable both statistically and theoreti-
cally. Statistically, it reduces the likelihood of finding false-positives. Theoretically,
the collapsed levels should be conceptually similar. If the donor attribute exhibits
collapsing, the collapsed levels should be along bilateral versus multilateral lines
and/or among Western donors, as suggested in previous work. If there is collaps-
ing within the project type level, it should group social development projects to-
gether and infrastructure projects together. There are not enough levels for collaps-
ing within the cost or government involvement attributes, so there should be no
change in these estimates. Following the recommendations in Egami et al. (2018),
I split the sample in two, with the first half used as training data for collapsing
factors and estimation of effects. The second half is then used for inference (i.e.
estimating standard errors and confident intervals).
Figure 1.7 plots the results from this analysis. In the first panel, the average
marginal effects with collapsing are presented. There is only limited collapsing
within the Project attribute, with education and water supply grouped together.
There is substantial collapsing within the Donor attribute, with the three Western
donors collapsing together, while the three non-Western donors are collapsed to-
gether. These groupings cut between bilateral and multilateral donors, implying
little support for any perceptual differences between these two types of donors.
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African Development Bank, China, Japan
United States, World Bank, European Union
DONOR:
−0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Estimate
Full sample with collapsing
N = 14,956
1.4.3 Equilibrium demand and observed aid distribution
The average marginal effects provide an estimate of how much respondents care
about the individual components of aid projects. If accountable to these prefer-
ences, what would the optimal portfolio of aid projects in Northern Uganda look
like?
To answer this question, I simulate preferences for a population of 198 citi-
zens using the variance-covariance matrix from Figure 1.5. For each non-cost aid
dimension, citizens are assigned a preference weight, the mean of which corre-
sponds to the dimension’s estimated AME. The weight for any single citizen may
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differ from this mean according to the estimated sample variance. For the cost di-
mension, I rely on the implied average sensitivity to a percentage point increase in
project cost, which is around -0.005. I therefore draw each citizen’s cost disutility
Ai from a normal distribution with a mean of -0.005.
With the citizen’s set of preferences in hand, the average utility for each project
is defined following Equation 1.2. For example, the utility function for the average
citizen for a Chinese education project with substantial government involvement
is as follows:
UEducation−Chinese−Substantial = 0.26× XProject=Education + 0.02× XDonor=China
+0.0× XGov.Involvement=Substantial − 0.005× PEducation−Chinese−Substantial
In this application, there are 72 configurations of projects, each of which present an
equilibrium cost and aid share given the equilibrium position of all others estimate
by computationally solving Equation 1.7.
Figure 1.8 presents the results of this exercise, with each panel differentiating
donors and the y-axis differentiating project types.17 The arrows depict the shift
from homogeneous preferences – that is, where citizens have no distinct prefer-
ences for aid projects – to each project’s optimal aid share given the estimated pref-
erences. These results indicate that the demand for social development projects
– specifically healthcare, education, and water supply – clearly outweighs any
consideration of who is providing the project. The demand for these projects is
17Since Government involvement does not influence citizen preferences, I do not differentiate aid
shares along this dimension.
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between 0.5-1.5 standard deviations greater than the baseline assuming homoge-
neous preferences. Though there is some differentiation in demand across donors,
this variation is relatively minimal, suggesting that the statistically significant dif-
ferences in preferences among donors shown in Figures 1.5 and 1.7 are substan-
tively unimportant once aggregated. Conversely, the relative distaste for large in-
frastructure projects exceeds any perceptual differences citizens may have among
the donors.
Figure 1.8: Equilibrium aid shares
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Arrows depict standard deviation shift in aid share
from homogeneous to equilibrium preferences
The equilibrium aid shares may act as benchmarks to compare with the ob-
served distribution of aid, with large deviations from demand indicating that the
Ugandan government is not optimally responding to their citizens. To do so, I
identify all aid project locations from in Northern Uganda since 2007, which ap-
proximates the end of the LRA insurgency (AidData, 2016). I then categorize each
project by donor and type (via sector codes), subsetting to only the donors and
project types that appear in the experimental design. Donors are then collapsed
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into two groups, Western and non-Western, as suggested by the regularized re-
sults in Figure 1.7. The levels of government involvement are pooled as well given
that there is no discernible difference across levels according to all estimates. Fi-
nally, I compare the summed dollar amount per project type by donor category to
the implied aid shares from Figure 1.8.18
Figure 1.9 plots deviations in equilibrium from observed aid shares, with bars
to the left of the zero vertical line indicating more observed aid than demanded,
and bars to the right of the zero vertical line indicating that there is greater de-
mand than observed. A few key results stand out. First, the distribution of roads
projects by Western donors in recent years, totaling nearly $200 million dollars, far
outweighs citizen demand in equilibrium. This suggests that the Ugandan gov-
ernment likely derives returns from targeting transportation infrastructure that do
not come from responding to citizen. This over-provision may come from the gov-
ernment preferring projects with opportunities for elite capture (Winters and Mar-
tinez, 2015) or from preferring projects that are highly visible to their voters (Hard-
ing, 2015). Western donors’ focus on healthcare projects is also too strong relative
to citizen demand. Finally, the demanded aid shares are larger than the observed
aid shares for all non-Western project types. These final two points are perhaps
counterintuitive given that, on average, citizens often prefer Western donors and
healthcare projects and do not prefer non-Western donors. Yet as formalized in the
theoretical model in this paper, baseline preferences are only useful in equilibrium
18This analysis is limited to projects that are geocoded and are coded for dollar amounts, corre-
sponding to around 60 percent of all project locations. The actual distribution of aid is during this
time period is therefore higher than reported here.
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when considering investments and preferences for all other potential projects. The
recent focus on Western roads and healthcare projects has thus overwhelmed the
diverse demands of Northern Ugandans.
Figure 1.9: Difference between equilibrium and observed aid shares in Northern
Uganda
1.5 Conclusion
This paper considers the unintended political implications of the distribution of
aid projects. I model the distribution of foreign aid as a function of citizen demand
for different aid projects, capturing the stylized context in which a recipient gov-
ernment is fully constrained by the preferences of their voters. Using a conjoint
experiment, I estimate the weight Northern Ugandans attach to several varying
dimensions of aid projects, including the donor, the sector targeted, the level of
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government involvement, and project cost. The combination of the formal model
and experimental estimates suggests that the Ugandan government would pri-
marily target social development projects and partner with Western donors if fully
constrained by voter preferences. By contrast, the returns to infrastructure projects
and projects funded by non-Western donors are more limited.
Comparing citizen demand to the observed distribution of aid, the Ugandan
government has over-provided Western healthcare projects even though the base-
line demand for these projects is high. This finding is likely the product of US-
AID’s emphasis on healthcare projects in the region in recent years, an emphasis
that has crowded-out a baseline demand for diverse investment. The Ugandan
government has also substantially over-provided Western-funded transportation
infrastructure. This mismatch between citizen preferences and government’s pro-
vision suggests that there is likely an important role for returns unrelated to voter
demand. For example, Ugandan elites may themselves prefer roads projects be-
cause they provide opportunities for economic kickbacks (Winters and Martinez,
2015; Olken, 2007), while average citizens relatively prefer other projects because
of these corrupt tendencies. Additionally, political elites may prefer targeting large
and highly visible transportation projects because they are more attributable to in-
cumbent politicians (Harding, 2015). Thus, when attempting to electorally lever-
age aid projects, the government likely considers not only voter preferences, but
also whether or not voters will see the investment.
Taken together, these findings suggest a nuanced understanding regarding the
micro-level political implications of aid distribution. On one hand, citizens in-
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deed have distinct preferences for aid, implying that the government may be elec-
torally rewarded by targeting projects in a way that matches these preferences. On
the other hand, the uncovered mismatch between voter demand and the actual
distribution of aid suggests that electoral mechanisms used to explain the subna-
tional distribution of aid may be less important than previously expected (Jablon-
ski, 2014; Briggs, 2014; Nunnenkamp et al., 2017; Briggs, 2012).
A primary limitation of this study is that the experimental design was imple-
mented in only one region of one country. While worth noting, this limitation is
minimized by the importance of the context, the robustness of the general find-
ings, and the generalizability of the theoretical model and experimental design.
Shown in the Appendix, results from a piloted conjoint experiment implemented
in Ghana largely mirrored several empirical patterns shown here.19
The findings presented in this paper, as well as the flexibility of the theoretical
and empirical approach detailed, suggest a few avenues for future work. First, ex-
cept for a manipulation check, I did not explore heterogeneity across non-experimental
variables. This choice was purposive – introducing non-experimental variation in-
troduces additional threats to internal validity. However, exploratory subgroup
analysis may be fruitful for understanding the mechanisms driving the demand
for aid. Since this paper primarily sought to establish this baseline causal esti-
mates, I leave this type of exploratory analysis for future work. Also regarding
19In the piloted conjoint experiment, citizens also substantially preferred social development
projects (healthcare and education) to infrastructure projects (roads and electrification). The least
preferred donor was the Chinese, while the most preferred was the World Bank. Respondents also
narrowly preferred minimal government involvement to substantial. There was no cost dimension
in the piloted experiment.
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non-experimental heterogeneity, the model may incorporate extensions to recipi-
ent governments looking to optimally target projects towards groups with poten-
tially heterogeneous preferences, such as geographically segregated ethnic groups
as in Ejdemyr et al. (2017). Finally, while the current substantive application fo-
cuses on the demand for foreign aid projects and politically optimal recipient be-
havior, the theoretical-empirical approach advanced in this paper is applicable to
the public goods provision literature in general, suggesting that this approach trav-
els broadly to a wide variety of contexts.
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1.6 Appendix












This section outlines the R code used to estimate equilibrium aid positions.
# betas = conjoint estimates for each attribute
# data = matrix with dummies given presence of an attribute
# A = cost disutility term; length of total citizens
# Pmin = minimum starting price
# step = size of step for finite differencing
# reps = number of iterations
function (betas , data , A, Pmin , step = 0.01 , reps = 100) {
citizens <- length (betas[, 1]) # total number of citizens
ncols <- length (data [1, ]) # total number of betas
nrows <- length (data[ ,1]) # total number of projects
P <- runif(nrows , Pmin , Pmin * 2) # randomly assign initial prices
U1 <- array (0, dim = c(citizens , nrows )) # citizen utilities
U2 <- array (0, dim = c(citizens , nrows )) # citizen utilities + step
store.p <- array (0, dim = c(reps , nrows )) # store prices
store.mkt <- array (0, dim = c(reps , nrows )) # store aid shares
for(j in 1: reps) { # iterations
for(i in 1: citizens ) { # citizens
for(k in 1: nrows) { # projects
Ps <- P + step
U1[i, k] <- sum(betas[i,] * data[k, ]) + A[i] * P[k]
U2[i, k] <- sum(betas[i,] * data[k, ]) + A[i] * Ps[k]
}
}
# bottom of logits
expsum1 <- rowSums (exp(U1))
expsum2 <- rowSums (exp(U2))
# probability each project is preferred (aid shares )
prob1 <- exp(U1) / expsum1
prob2 <- exp(U2) / expsum2
# f‘(x)
m1 <- A * prob1 * (1 - prob1)
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r1 <- P * colMeans (m1) + colMeans (prob1)
# f‘(x) with P + step
m2 <- A * prob2 * (1 - prob2)
r2 <- Ps * colMeans (m2) + colMeans (prob2)
# approximation of f‘‘(x)
rs <- (r2 - r1) / step
# newton - raphson update
P <- P - r1 / rs
# store prices and aid shares
store.p[j, ] <- P
store.mkt[j, ] <- colMeans (prob1)
}
list(store.p = store.p, store.mkt = store.mkt)
}
1.6.2 The visibility of aid in Northern Uganda
Figure 1.11 depicts a representative example of foreign aid signs commonly seen
in Uganda and other African countries. In this example, there are two signs. The
first, covering a majority of the image, is an African Development Bank project for
“Construction of Gulu Market in Gulu Municipal Country.” This sign notes that
the Government of Uganda is a key partner and the Ministry of Local Government
is the implementing agency. The sign also depicts the intended beneficiaries, as
well as some private contractors. Less visible to the right is a second project for the
construction of roads funded by the Japanese.
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1.6.3 Piloted conjoint experiment in Ghana
This section presents a piloted conjoint experiment conducted in Ghana. In this
pilot, respondents stated preferences regarding aid projects that varied along 3
non-cost dimensions. The first attribute – Donor – takes four possible levels: 1) the
U.S.; 3) China; 3) the World Bank; and 4) the African Development Bank. The U.S.
and China represent the most important Western and non-Western bilateral donors
in the region, respectively, while the World Bank and the African Development
Bank act as the most multilateral lenders in the region. The second attribute –
Project – captures variation in project type. This attribute also takes four levels:
1) electrification; 2) roads; 3) education; and 4) healthcare. The first two levels
proxy infrastructure projects, while the last two proxy social development projects.
The final attribute, Government Involvement – references the amount of discretion
the recipient will have in the project implementation process and can either be 1)
minimal or 2) substantial.
Respondents were randomly exposed to pairs of projects, of which they were
instructed to state their preferred choice. Project attributes were randomly as-
signed within each pairing, while attribute orderings were randomly assigned
within respondents. The sample was drawn from the Central Region of Ghana
by first identifying several population centers.20 Within these population centers,
enumerators randomly sampled every third or fifth household (depending on pop-
ulation density) from a fixed starting point. Within each household, respondents
20These towns and villages included Abura, Aseba, Kwmaksese, Cape Coast Municipal, Elmina,
Komenda, Edina, Eguafo, and Abirem.
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were randomly selected after stratifying by gender. In total, around 220 respon-
dents were shown a maximum of 5 project pairs. Removing the round of piloted
responses and non-responses results in a sample of 1980 evaluated projects, or 990
project pairings.
Figure 1.13 presents the average marginal component effects (AMCEs) for each
project attribute. All AMCEs are estimated using the non-parametric strategy de-
scribed in Hainmueller et al. (2014) with standard errors clustered by respondent.
For all levels, estimates are relative to option centered at zero. Respondents sub-
stantially prefer World Bank projects to those funded by the Chinese, while U.S.
and African Development Bank projects are also significantly preferred to Chinese
projects, albeit less so. Both social development projects – health and education
– are strongly preferred to the infrastructure projects, with roads being the least
preferred. Finally, the average participant preferred minimal to substantial gov-
ernment involvement, a result that is narrowly statistically significant at the 0.05
level.
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Figure 1.13: AMCEs of attributes on project preferences in Ghana
Note: standard errors clustered by respondent. Error bars denote 95 percent confidence intervals.
Effects within each level relative to baseline attribute at zero.
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2
Buying Votes from IDPs: a randomized
response experiment in post-conflict
Uganda
Abstract
With the help of international donors, governments often internally dis-
place their citizens in response to armed conflict. I argue that the severe
economic and social network shocks associated with displacement have
implications for the targeting of vote buying post-conflict. I present an
original randomized response experiment fielded in Northern Uganda,
which provides cover for respondents that may otherwise be hesitant
to report selling their votes. The results of this experiment show that
former IDPs are more often targeted with vote buying than non-IDPs,
a finding that suggests displacement as an economic shock restructures
the nature of clientelism after conflict.
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Millions of people are forced into internally displaced persons (IDP) camps each
year due to armed conflict. As of 2017, the number of IDPs reached 40 million,
including 6.5 million in both Syria and Colombia, nearly 4.5 million in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo, 1.6 million in Iraq, around 2 million in Sudan, South
Sudan, and Yemen, and 1.7 million in Nigeria.1 Most research focuses on the dev-
astating patterns associated with internal displacement during conflict, from in-
creasing the spread of violence (e.g. Bohnet et al., 2018) to increasing the spread of
disease (e.g. Omole et al., 2015). Less attention is paid to the effects of displace-
ment on society after violence wanes and IDPs return to their former homes. This
paper argues that the return of IDPs has important implications for the nature of
political competition in the post-conflict period.
Political competition in contexts susceptible to civil conflict and internal dis-
placement is oftentimes clientelistic, based on the selective distribution of goods
to voters by politicians and their brokers in return political support (Hicken, 2011;
Mares and Young, 2016).2 I develop an argument that views internal displacement
as a shock to two features of the electorate that politicians and brokers use to tar-
get vote buying, a particular clientelistic strategy. On one hand, IDPs experience
a substantial economic shock because they are removed from their land and often
struggle to find income-generating opportunities during and after displacement.
This shock makes IDPs poorer than they would have been absent displacement,
1All references to IDP data at the country-level come from the Internal Displacement Monitoring
Centre (iDMC).
2At the broadest level, underdevelopment is a robust predictor of civil conflict (e.g. Fearon and
Laitin, 2003). While clientelism in not unique to developing countries, it is very common through-
out the developing world (Kitschelt et al., 2007). Thus, there is clear overlap between conflict-
affected countries and countries with pervasive clientelism.
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implying that they may be more cheaply bought off than non-IDPs (e.g. Dixit and
Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005; Calvo and Murillo, 2004) and need to rely on favors
to regain access to their pre-displacement land. On the other hand, displacement
is also a substantial shock to social networks, severing the ties that embed vot-
ers within political networks. Since politicians and brokers can more easily iden-
tify and monitor voters embedded within key networks (e.g. Stokes et al., 2013)
and voters within dense social networks more generally (Cruz, 2019), the network
disruption felt by IDPs suggests that they may instead be inefficient vote buying
targets.
The twin economic and social network shocks therefore imply competing im-
plications for the targeting of vote buying. To explore these implications, I use
an original randomized response experiment to estimate which respondents were
likely targeted with vote buying in the 2016 elections in Northern Uganda. Like the
more common list experiment, the randomized response method provides cover
for respondents when answering sensitive questions, therefore reducing the so-
cial desirability that often plagues studies of vote buying. Using recently devel-
oped multivariate regression techniques for analyzing randomized response ex-
periments (Blair et al., 2015a), I show that citizens that were displaced during the
LRA insurgency are more often the target of vote buying than non-former IDPs, a
result most consistent with the logic of displacement as an economic shock.
Methodologically, this paper contributes to the empirical literature on vote buy-
ing that seeks to address the inherent sensitivity of the topic. Others, including
Corstange (2012, 2018) in Lebanon, Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012) in Nicaragua,
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and Kramon (2016) in Kenya, have shown the list experiment to be a powerful tool
for this purpose. I show that the randomized response technique may be similarly
powerful for estimating the vote buying and its causes. The application of this
design is especially important following the results from Rosenfeld et al. (2016),
who show that the randomized response technique generates estimates closer to
observed behavior than the list experiment. Future studies of vote buying may
therefore be improved by considering the randomized response design alone or in
tandem with the list experiment alternative.
2.1 Internal Displacement and Vote Buying
Vote buying occurs when politicians and their brokers offer rewards, like money,
gifts, or favors, to citizens in return for their vote (Mares and Young, 2016). Be-
cause the reward is contingent on the voter’s behavior, it is a political strategy
under the umbrella of clientelism (Hicken, 2011). Clientelistic electoral strategies
are common throughout the developing world where programmatic party-based
competition is limited (Kitschelt et al., 2007). Despite the widespread use of this
type of these strategies, all voters are not equally likely targets. Given resource
constraints, politicians cannot attempt to buy off every voter. Instead, certain vot-
ers may be more efficiently targeted with vote buying than others.
Existing work suggests that two characteristics of voters – where they fall in
the poverty distribution and their embeddedness in certain social networks – are
crucial for the targeting of clientelistic exchange. This section describes how in-
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ternal displacement acts as an economic and social network shock and details the
implications of these shocks for the targeting of vote buying post-conflict.
2.1.1 Displacement as an economic shock
Models of clientelism often imply that that poorer voters are especially efficient
targets for vote buying. On the margin, a personal handout is more important
for voters at the lower end of the income distribution, suggesting that poorer vot-
ers may be bought off more cheaply than the richer voters (Dixit and Londregan,
1996; Stokes, 2005; Calvo and Murillo, 2004).3 Civil conflict and the destruction
of human and physical capital that follows in its wake alters the distribution of
poverty. The average person within a conflict-affected region is likely poorer than
they would have been absent conflict. However, the efficiency of targeting the poor
with vote buying is due not to absolute poverty, but to some voters being relatively
poorer than others. For conflict to increase vote buying through an income shock
mechanism, it must do so because it is more economically destructive for subsets
of certain voters.
The economic costs associated with displacement further induces poverty for
the displaced beyond that of the general post-conflict population, implying that
former IDPs may be especially efficient targets of vote buying. Within camps, in-
come generating opportunities are severely limited and the jobs available are often
3Empirical tests of this model in Africa are mixed. Jensen and Justesen (2014), for example, show
that poverty does predict vote buying at the individual and country levels across the region. Yet
when disaggregated the effects by country, Mares and Young (2016) suggest that the relationship
is context specific, with richer voters in certain countries – including Uganda – reporting a higher
propensity of vote buying than the poor.
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informal (e.g. Aysa-Lastra, 2011). In Northern Uganda, some IDPs generated in-
come from selling items like firewood and charcoal to others, or found sporadic
manual labor (e.g. construction, digging). These strategies, however, generated
only little economic value beyond subsistence (Horn, 2009). Relative to the non-
displaced, IDPs are therefore subjected to several years of stagnant economic pro-
ductivity. Upon return, economic opportunities for IDPs are also often limited.
Following civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, returnees were sub-
stantially less likely to be working than non-IDPs (Kondylis, 2010). Even two years
after displacement in Uganda, Fiala (2015) shows that returned IDPs still signifi-
cantly lagged behind the non-displaced in both consumption and assets. This per-
sistent negative economic shock therefore suggests that former IDPs may be more
likely targeted with vote buying because of their relative poverty.
In normal times, citizens in contexts like Northern Uganda rely on their land
as their most productive asset. The lack of income-generating opportunities dur-
ing displacement is therefore due in no small part to the removal of citizens from
their land. However, beyond fueling the more general income shock, this removal
has implications for vote buying post-conflict because citizens often struggle to
recover their pre-displacement land. According to data from Adelman and Pe-
terman (2014), returnees in Northern Uganda lost an average of 3.4 acres of land
during the first 7 years of resettlement and spent 61 percent of a year’s consump-
tion expenditure on land disputes ($356). These difficulties are due primarily to
the informal nature of land tenure in many post-conflict settings.4
4As estimated by Deininger (2004), around 90 percent of land in sub-Saharan Africa is unregis-
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Evidence suggests that politicians and their brokers leverage the informal na-
ture of land tenure to selectively distribute a specific type of favor – land titles – to
buy votes from IDPs. As argued by Albertus (2013), land is a particularly useful
good for buying votes because it results in inter-temporal interactions between vot-
ers, brokers, and politicians. This is in contrast to the usual goods that are used to
buy votes, like cash handouts, that are one-time payments and therefore suscep-
tible to the commitment problems associated with clientelism. This practice has
been common in recent elections in Northern Uganda. Médard and Golaz (2013),
for example, describes the practice of “gift giving” – or the direct transfer of land or
land titles – to voters that would otherwise lack access to official titling. Local gov-
ernment officials act as the key brokers in this process. According to Meinert and
Kjaer (2016, p. 779), “. . . there are many reports of LC1, 2, and 3 councillors being
involved in the business of buying votes for land.” This suggests that former IDPs
may be more often targeted with vote buying because of the specific effects of re-
moval from land that go beyond the negative effects of displacement as a broader
income shock.
2.1.2 Displacement as a shock to social networks
Variation in voter social networks also influence the targeting of vote buying. While
relative poverty increases vote buying because of the increasing returns to target-
ing the poor, embeddeness in social networks increases vote buying by making it
easier to identify willing voters and to monitor their voting behavior. Monitoring
tered and untitled; 60 percent of African households fall on this land (Boone, 2009).
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of this sort ensures that voters will either uphold their end of the vote buying bar-
gain or be punished for reneging (Stokes et al., 2013). Depending on the political
context, key networks may be partisan (e.g. Calvo and Murillo, 2013) or based on
a shared identity like ethnicity (e.g. Van de Walle, 2007; Baldwin, 2016).
Existing work highlights the importance of network linkages that connect vot-
ers to politicians, be it through personal connections like familial ties or through
intermediaries embedded in local communities (Cruz et al., 2017; Fafchamps and
Labonne, 2016). Cruz (2019) argues that even absent direct links to politicians and
brokers, voters with large social networks are useful targets because of opportu-
nities for group-level monitoring and social pressures to adhere to the clientelistic
deal. Well-networked voters, with linkages either to politicians and broker or sim-
ply many linkages in general, are therefore more likely to be targeted with vote
buying.
The uprooting of families subjected to displacement ruptures the structure of
existing social networks. In Northern Uganda, mothers described the process of
displacement as “rapid, unexpected and chaotic” and that “...the degree to which
households ended up living with pre-displacement network members was largely
out of households’ control” Adelman (2013, p. 286).5 Depending on the degree of
disruption, families were left with only limited contact with their pre-displacement
connections. The lack of regular interaction with family, clan members, and vil-
lage elders made everyday practices like disciplining children and monitoring the
5Using the randomness associated with this shock to social networks, Adelman (2013) shows
that children in families with severely disrupted social networks experienced worse nutrition out-
comes.
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behavior of community members difficult (Adelman, 2013), contributing to what
Baines and Rosenoff Gauvin (2014, p. 8) refer to as a “loss of social control.”
Displacement therefore severs many of the social ties that link voters together
pre-displacement. The implications of this shock for vote buying likely depend
on how well former IDPs can rebuild social networks upon return. If networks
are slow to rebuild, the lack of social ties connecting returned IDPs to other voters
and linking them to politicians implies that former IDPs will be less likely targeted
with vote buying than non-IDPs. By contrast, if returned IDPs are able to rebuild
networks, their linkages may look similar to non-IDPs, implying that the network
shock should have no effect on the targeting of vote buying.
2.2 Displacement and Vote Buying in Northern Uganda
I focus relationship between internal displacement and vote buying in Northern
Uganda. As summarized in Figure 2.1, this region was under intense violence for
decades beginning in the late 1980s. This violence was due primarily to the Lord’s
Resistance Army’s insurgency, led by the well-known Joseph Kony. Other than a
small number of early volunteers, nearly all of the LRA were forcibly conscripted
children. The LRA typically raided villages at nighttime, terrorizing the rural pop-
ulation.6 The Ugandan government responded to this violence by forcibly dis-
placing the rural population into IDP camps. Branch (2009, p. 480) describes how
the Ugandan People’s Defense force (UPDF, the Uganda military) executed this
6See Annan and Blattman (2008) for a complete discussion of the LRA and child soldiering.
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displacement:
The UPDF drove hundreds of thousands of Acholi peasants out of their
villages and into camps through a campaign of murder, intimidation,
and the bombing and burning of entire villages. After the formation
of the camps, the UPDF announced that anyone found outside of the
camps would be considered a rebel and killed.
The move into IDP camps was therefore anything but voluntary. As the insur-
gency peaked around 2005, 1.8 million Ugandans in the North were displaced into
camps. The slow return process began following a ceasefire in 2006. By 2009,
nearly 450,000 citizens were in the camps; until 2015, this number remained as
high as 30,000 (data from iDMC).
To test the relationship between internal displacement and vote buying, this
study presents the results from an original survey and randomized response ex-
periment fielded in Northern Uganda in May of 2018. Respondents were drawn
from three districts in the Acholi sub-region, including Amuru, Gulu, and Kitgum,
corresponding to the epicenter of the LRA insurgency.
Sampling followed a multistaged strategy, with subcounties, parishes, and ul-
timately polling stations within each district randomly selected from a complete
list. Enumerators used a random-walk pattern to sample households and respon-
dents were stratified by gender. A team of enumerators implemented the survey
in either Acholi or English, depending on the respondent’s preference.7 The sam-
ple totals 774 respondents, with 180 coming from Amuru, 360 from Gulu, and 234
7The West Nile district Arua was also sampled as part of the larger survey effort, but a low
prevalence of former IDPs in this region makes including respondents from this region inappro-
priate. Including the Arua sample results in nearly identical point estimates and standard errors
decrease in size as expected with larger sample.
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Figure 2.1: The distribution of violence in Uganda, 1989-2010
Note: Conflict data from UCDP-GED (Croicu and Sundberg, 2015).
from Kitgum, proportions that correspond generally to the relative population lev-
els among the districts.8 After adjusting for non-response across the variables of
interest and covariates in the baseline estimates, the final sample consists of 759
observations.
2.2.1 A randomized response experiment to estimate vote buying
Vote buying in Uganda, as elsewhere, is a sensitive topic. The practice is not only
perceived as socially undesirable – it is illegal and punishable with up to three
8According to the 2014 census, the population totals for Gulu, Kitgum, and Amuru Districts are
around 276,000, 204,000, and 187,000, respectively.
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years in prison. Direct questioning therefore unsurprisingly runs the risk of un-
derestimating the true prevalence of vote buying. This problem is not necessarily
problematic since vote buying in this study is the dependent variable, implying
that estimated effects may simply be understated. However, if responses are cor-
related with other factors, like political preferences or being formerly displaced,
estimates of the effects of these factors will be biased (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al.,
2012).
To avoid this pitfall, this paper relies on a randomized response experiment.
In particular, I use a “forced response design” (Blair et al., 2015a), in which re-
spondents were instructed to answer “yes”, “no”, or state their truthful answer
depending on the roll of a dice. The goal of this strategy is similar to that of the list
experiment used to estimate vote buying by Corstange (2012, 2018) in Lebanon,
(Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012) in Nicaragua, and Çarkoğlu and Aytaç (2015) in
Turkey. According to Rosenfeld et al. (2016), though the randomized response de-
sign is marginally more complex than the list experiment alternative, it does better
in terms of ensuring respondent privacy and minimizing bias and variance.
Following the design in Blair et al. (2015a), respondents were read the following
prompt prior to being questioned about vote buying (enumerator instructions in
brackets):
For this question, I want you to answer yes or no. But I want you to
consider the number of your dice throw. If 1 shows on the dice, tell me
no. If 6 shows, tell me yes. But if another number, like 2 or 3 or 4 or
5 shows, tell your own opinion about the question that I will ask after
you throw the dice. [TURN AWAY FROM THE RESPONDENT] Now
you throw the dice so that I cannot see what comes out. Please do not
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forget the number that comes out [WAIT TO TURN AROUND UNTIL
RESPONDENT SAYS YES TO] Have you thrown the dice? Have you
picked it up?
These instructions are derived from a few important design features. First, 16 of
the time, the dice instructs respondents to answer “no”, 16 of the time “yes”, and
2
3 of the time to answer either their true response, be it “yes” or “no”. Second,
only the respondent is aware of their dice roll and whether or not they answered
the question truthfully. This feature minimizes the concern that a respondent will
bias their answer towards the what they assume the interviewer believes is socially
desirable. Third, because the roll of the dice is not known, the truthfulness of any
given respondent’s answer cannot be known for certain. However, the known dice
roll probabilities may be used in to model the probability that a respondent would
answer “yes” truthfully (Blair et al., 2015a).
After introducing the rules of the dice and walking through several practice
rounds, the enumerators read the following question regarding vote buying:
During the most recent elections in 2016, did a candidate or someone
form a political party offer you something, like money, a gift, food, or a
service, in return for your vote?
This phrasing is nearly identical to that used by the Afrobarometer, but adds the
phrase “or a service” following Corstange (2018). This prompt is therefore general
enough to incorporate land-related gifts and services that are appear important
in Northern Uganda, while also accounting for more traditional goods. Around
68 percent of those answering the question responded “No”, while just over 32
percent answered “Yes.” Adjusting for the design parameters, a simple estimate of
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the prevalence of truthful “Yes” responses is 0.2336, suggesting around 23 percent
of the sampled population was targeted with vote buying.9
2.2.2 Modeling the targeting of vote buying
The primary independent variable is a binary indicator of whether or not a respon-
dent was in an IDP camp during the LRA insurgency. Shown in Table 2.1, just over
70 percent of respondents reported being internally displaced during the war. Sev-
eral other independent variables also enter the model. To proxy poverty, I rely on
three indicators, the first of which takes the value of 1 if a surveyed household has
a thatched roof and 0 otherwise. Nearly 70 percent of those sampled have thatched
roofs. The other two poverty indicators track whether or not a household has elec-
tricity and/or running water. Around 26 percent of respondents report having at
least one of these goods.
Table 2.1: Summary of covariates
Variable Mean Range
IDP camp 0.705 1/0
Female 0.504 1/0
Age/10 3.37 continuous
Age sqd./10 129.322 continuous
Education 3.126 1-7
Thatched roof 0.695 1/0
Electricity 0.256 1/0
Water 0.26 1/0
NRM support 0.284 1/0
FDC support 0.335 1/0
Other/none support 0.381 1/0
9The probability of truthful a “Yes” response is Pr(Zi) =
Pr(Yi)−Pr f orced yes
1−Pr f orced yes−Pr f orced no .
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I model political preferences via indicators for Political support, derived from a
question regarding which party the respondent would vote for if elections were
held tomorrow. Shown in Table 2.1, around 28.4 percent of the sample claimed
to support the National Resistance Movement (NRM), the party that has been in
power since the 1980s. Northern Ugandans are generally less supportive of the
NRM relative to the rest of the country, a finding consistent with the estimate pre-
sented here. Another 33.5 percent of respondents support the Forum for Demo-
cratic Change (FDC), which acts as the main position party to the NRM. The final
38.1 percent reported no party support or support one of many small parties.
Existing work has found significant variation between males and females re-
garding the targeting of vote buying (e.g. Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012), suggest-
ing that this factor might confound the estimated effect of IDP camp. I use the
indicator Female, which takes the value of 1 if a respondent is female and 0 if male
to adjust for differences between sexes. Shown in Table 2.1, around 50 percent of
the sample are female as expected given stratification by gender. I adjust for Age
(divided by 10 to ease interpretation) and its square. While the sample is limited to
those over the age of 18, age is likely related to being internally displaced during
the war since older citizens were alive during a larger time period. The average
respondent is around 33 years old. Finally, I adjust for respondent Education, rang-
ing from no formal schooling to complete secondary schooling. The average re-
spondent has completed primary school. Conditioning on education is especially
important with the randomized response design, for which some respondents may
grasp more readily than others. I also use district fixed effects to adjust for baseline
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variation across the sampled geographic areas.
Blair et al. (2015a) provide a multivariate logistic regression estimator for mod-
eling the probability of truthful “yes” responses adjusting for the randomized re-
sponse design parameters. This estimator improves upon earlier list experiments
that relied on comparing means across subgroups as in Gonzalez-Ocantos et al.
(2012). I use the rr package in R to estimate all randomized response regression
models throughout this paper (Blair et al., 2015b).
2.3 Results
Prior to presenting the full regression results, I first explore descriptive variation
in IDP camp and Vote buying. Shown in Figure 2.2, respondents in all districts that
were in IDP camps were more likely to answer “yes” to the vote buying random-
ized response treatment. In particular, those in IDP camps were between 9 and 14
percentage points more likely to answer “yes”. Adjusting for the experimental de-
sign parameters, this difference increases to between around 14 and 20 percentage
points. Thus, at least descriptively, there is a strong, positive association between
being in an IDP camp and being the target of vote buying in the sample.
To test this relationship adjusting for covariates, Table 2.2 presents logistic re-
gression estimates adjusted for the forced choice randomized response probabili-
ties. The indicator for IDP camp is positive with a standard error implying a statis-
tically meaningful estimate (95 percent CI 0.54 and 2.63). This result strongly sug-
gests that former IDPs are more often targeted with vote buying than non-former
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Figure 2.2: Displaced peoples are more likely to answer yes to the vote buying
randomized response instrument
IDPs across Northern Uganda.
Table 2.2: Randomized response logistic regression.
Variable Estimate SE CI lower CI upper
IDP camp 1.57 0.54 0.51 2.63
Thatched roof -0.43 0.39 -1.19 0.33
Electricity 0.53 0.43 -0.31 1.37
Water 0.70 0.39 -0.06 1.46
NRM support 1.08 0.41 0.27 1.88
FDC support 0.49 0.41 -0.31 1.30
Female 0.42 0.33 -0.23 1.07
Age/10 0.25 0.77 -1.26 1.77
Age sqd/10 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Education 0.05 0.12 -0.19 0.29
Intercept -3.37 1.60 -6.51 -0.22
Gulu district -0.57 0.41 -1.38 0.24
Kitgum district -0.72 0.46 -1.61 0.17
Amuru is the omitted district and Other/none is the omitted
political support category. CIs are 95 percent. N = 759.
Supporters of the NRM are significantly more likely to report vote buying than
non-partisans (95 percent CI 0.27 to 1.88), while FDC supporters are not (95 per-
cent CI -0.31 to 1.30). Neither Thatched roof, Electricity, nor Water show statistically
meaningful associations with vote buying. Therefore poverty alone, holding dis-
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placement status constant, does not predict vote buying in the sample.
To put these estimates into substantive terms, I run a series of 10,000 simula-
tions drawn from a multivariate distribution using the covariance matrix from the
model presented in Table 2.2. Shown in Figure 2.3, the average marginal effect of a
discrete change in IDP camp from 0 to 1 is around 0.14, suggesting that, on average,
formerly displaced peoples are 14 percentage points more likely to be targeted with
vote buying than non-former IDPs. As shown by the confidence intervals, over 95
percent of the simulated effects are positive, implying that, even after introducing
added noise from the randomized response technique, these estimates are unlikely
due to chance or measurement error. Compare these estimated effects to those in
Figure 2.3 for NRM supporter, which hold IDP camp constant at 0 and shift NRM
supporter from 0 to 1. The average marginal effect suggests that supporters of the
ruling part are around 9 percentage points more likely the target of vote buying
than non-NRM supporters. Nearly all simulated differences are positive, again
suggesting that these estimates are unlikely due to chance.
There are two primary implications of these results. First, the clear positive re-
lationship between displacement and vote buying suggests that the negative social
network shock did not make former IDPs less likely targets. Instead, the logic of
displacement as an economic shock is more plausible. However, the lack of associ-
ation between measure of poverty and vote buying implies a complex relationship.
These findings – a positive association between displacement and no association
with baseline poverty – may imply an important role for the poverty faced by for-
mer IDPs uncaptured in the covariates. Likely important here is the role of land,
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Figure 2.3: Marginal effects of IDP camp and NRM support
though this relationship cannot be test without additional data.
2.3.1 Validating results with of distributional expectations
As a supplemental test, this section explores whether internal displacement pre-
dicts expectations of future electoral handouts. I follow Calvo and Murillo (2013,
2019) and rely on a survey measure which asks respondents how likely it would
be, after a successfully winning the next Presidential election, the NRM or an op-
position party would provide them with material benefits. Importantly, unlike
the randomized response indicator, this measure does not attempt to minimize
social desirability bias, implying that estimating effects will likely be understated
and potentially biased. However, if expectations of future handouts are correlated
with previous experiences with vote buying, these measures may at least partially
validate the previous results.
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Table 2.3 presents two linear regression models, the first for expectations of
handouts from the NRM and the second from an opposition party, with the de-
pendent variable ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 4 (very likely). Note that the
sample size decreases from 759 in the randomized response regressions to 701 and
682 for the models 1 and 2 in Table 2.3, respectively. This suggests that respondents
were likely more hesitant to answer the direct electoral handout questions than the
randomized response vote buying question.
The estimate for IDP camp for expectations of future NRM handouts is positive,
with a 95 percent confidence interval ranging from -0.025 to 0.126. This estimate
is therefore consistent with the previous estimates, though itself not statistically
significant at the 0.05 level. The IDP camp estimate for opposition parties is again
positive, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 0.022 to 0.188. Taken together,
these results largely validate those from the randomized response experiment: for-
mer IDPs are more likely to expect to be targeted with vote buying in future elec-
tions than non-IDPs.
2.4 Conclusion
In response to the brutal LRA insurgency, the Ugandan government and interna-
tional donors displaced millions of Northerners into camps. While this decision
was motivated by counter-insurgency and humanitarian concerns (Branch, 2009),
this paper shows that the political consequences of internal displacement have



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Northern Ugandans internally displaced during the LRA insurgency are the tar-
gets of vote buying much more often than those that were not displaced. This
positive relationship is consistent with the logic of displacement as a severe eco-
nomic shock, with IDPs poorer than non-IDPs and without access to their pre-
displacement land, making them efficient targets for vote buying.
This finding is built on a randomized response experimental research design
tailored to elicit truthful responses to a topic as sensitive as vote buying. While
others have used the list experiment for similar reasons, the randomized response
technique has yet to be embraced in studies of vote buying. Compared to the list
experiment, randomized response has been shown to produce estimates closer to
ground truth (Rosenfeld et al., 2016). Future work should therefore consider fol-
lowing the randomized response to estimate vote buying applied as an alternative
to or along with a list experiment.
There are two primary limitations in this paper. First, without additional data
on pre-displacement economic status and land access, I cannot directly observe the
general economic shock mechanism or tease out the specific role of removal from
land. Future data collection efforts should prioritize the collection of such data.
Descriptions of recent elections in Uganda do, however, suggest that land is an
important factor for targeting IDPs, with reports of local officials using land to buy
votes in the Northern region (Meinert and Kjaer, 2016; Médard and Golaz, 2013).
A second limitation is that I have only presented evidence from one region
within one country. This limitation is due to the resource-intensive nature of origi-
nal data collection at the individual level in the developing world. Yet even absent
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additional data collection, the comparative implications of this study are clear: we
should expect IDPs to be targeted with vote buying in post-conflict settings, es-
pecially where land rights are informal. For example, this logic should hold in a
country like South Sudan with around 2 million IDPs and widely customary land
rights once violence calms. Contexts outside of Africa with informal land rights
and severe internal displacement, including Yemen (2.34 million IDPs) and Colom-
bia (5.7 million IDPs), should also see returning IDPs targeted with vote buying.
By contrast, the 800,000 IDPs in Ukraine will unlikely be similarly targeted because
land rights in this country are generally formalized. I leave the validation of these




Administrative Capacity, and Public
Goods: the negative consequences of
reform in Burkina Faso
Abstract
While countries throughout the developing world continue to increase
their number of subnational administrative units, the consequences of
administrative unit creation remain poorly understood. This paper ar-
gues that newly created administrative units face relative difficulty gen-
erating resources and staffing a full and competent bureaucracy, and as
a result, are less capable of providing public goods to their constituen-
cies. These challenges to administrative capacity are less consequential
within mother units that were carved apart to create new splinter units
and are entirely absent in non-splitting units. Proxying the local pro-
vision of public goods with a measure of nighttime light intensity in
Burkina Faso, the findings indicate that the public goods provision in
newly created splinter provinces dropped significantly relative to pre-
fragmentation levels, while other administrative units remained largely
unaffected.
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The international development community has long viewed decentralized gover-
nance as crucial for an effective provision of public goods and services. The World
Bank went as far as to designate decentralization as one of only a few develop-
ment priorities in the 21st century (Yusuf et al., 1999). It is therefore unsurprising
that donors have recommended this type of reform across several highly central-
ized countries throughout the developing world (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006).
In recent decades, many developing countries have also experimented with dras-
tic increases in their number of subnational administrative units. This process –
known as government fragmentation or administrative unit proliferation – is often im-
plemented in conjunction with broader decentralization reforms under the guise
of bringing government “closer to the people.”1 However, as argued by Resnick
(2017, p. 48), “...progress on decentralization is sometimes solely equated with
the number of subnational governments rather than how well those new sub-units
actually function.”
Though donor commitment to decentralization stems from a motivation to im-
prove the provision of public goods within developing countries, I argue that a
tendency of reforming governments to respond with administrative unit prolifera-
tion has consequences in opposition to the ostensible purpose of decentralization.
In short, newly created subnational units lack sufficient administrative capacity to
deliver public goods to their constituents. Drawing on recent work on state/or-
ganizational capacity (Centeno et al., 2017) and administrative unit proliferation
1Decentralization refers to the delegation of administrative, political, and/or financial authority
to subnational governing units (Falleti, 2005), while government fragmentation references only the
size and number of subnational units, not their authority.
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(Grossman and Lewis, 2014; Lewis, 2014), I conceptualize administrative capacity
as a function of access to resources from local taxation and central government
transfers, and the quantity and quality of local bureaucracy. Localities within ad-
ministrative units that are not affected by fragmentation are better able to both tax
their citizens and bargain for transfers from the center, while also holding over
their bureaucratic experience and staff from the pre-fragmentation period. Mother
units – those carved in order to provide territory for the newly created splinter
units – have similar bureaucratic experience and ability to tax, though their bar-
gaining position in the competition for centrally distributed resources is dimin-
ished by their shrunken territory. The newly created splinter units, however, are
placed in the most limited position to derive resources and face severe bureaucratic
constraints.
The argument in this paper implies a puzzling result: the commitment of the
donor community to decentralization may spur developing countries to create ad-
ministrative units too weak to effectively provide public goods. Thus, though
donors may be motivated by developmental goals when pushing decentralization,
governments that respond with premature administrative unit creation likely face
consequences antithetical to development.
In an era in which fragmentation is commonplace in the developing world,
understanding how administrative capacity mediates the effectiveness of the pro-
vision of public goods is of clear importance. However, absent experimentally
assigning communities to different fragmentation types, it is very difficult to tease
out the effects of fragmentation on the public goods provision absent confounding
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factors. This paper offers a second-best alternative research design to this experi-
mental ideal by presenting evidence from the substantial increase in provinces in
Burkina Faso, a case that has received very limited attention in the study of the
politics of development in Africa (Briggs, 2017). I compile data on the local provi-
sion of public goods – proxied by a measure of nighttime light intensity – within
departments, the administrative unit that falls just below the province. Because
departments remain fixed before and after provincial fragmentation, I am able to
compare patterns of the public goods provision over time within departments un-
der different provincial configurations, implying that changes in public goods out-
comes can be attributed to falling into an alternative provincial state. Difference-
in-differences estimates strongly suggest that departments within the entirely new
splinter provinces are significantly worse-off relative to those within non-splitting
provinces than they were prior to splitting. Departments within mother provinces,
however, appear only slightly worse-off than non-splitters. Communities within
splinter provinces appear to experience a worse public goods provision from frag-
mentation across different specifications of the post-fragmentation period, an effect
that is unrelated to endogenous selection into fragmentation types.
This paper is one of only a few studies to rigorously estimate the effects of frag-
mentation on the provision of public goods (see Grossman et al., 2017; Asher and
Novosad, 2015), and, to my knowledge, constitutes the first evidence of robust and
negative distributional consequences. This evidence therefore also contributes to
the broader literature on the limitations of political and economic reform in sub-
Saharan Africa (e.g. Van de Walle, 2001) and the literature on the limitations of ad-
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ministrative unit creation specifically, which has to date noted that fragmentation
may be exploited for political reasons and may lead to recentralization (see Gross-
man and Lewis, 2014; Lewis, 2014; Green, 2010; Malesky, 2009, among others),
but has yet to show the negative consequences for the provision of public goods.
While existing perspectives have noted the potential for distributional effects from
an altered political landscape (Grossman et al., 2017), the theoretical framework
proposed here offers an alternative perspective that prioritizes the unique chal-
lenges of governance in the developing world that stem from limited administra-
tive capacity. These challenges have been previously described in the context of
decentralization in general (e.g. Bardhan, 2002) and government fragmentation in
particular (e.g. Lewis, 2014), but have yet to be explicitly linked to the provision of
public goods after reform.
3.1 Related Work
Contemporary work has primarily focused on explaining the implementation of
government fragmentation, centering broadly on two categories of causes. Ar-
guments within the first category view administrative unit creation as stemming
from demands for political autonomy and improved access to state resources from
below. In Indonesia, for example, Pierskalla (2016b) shows that district splits were
largely a function of demand for more ethnically homogeneous districts. Kimura
(2010) argues that alliances in Indonesia formed across multiple territorial levels,
creating coalitions demanding new districts and provinces. Similarly, in Nigeria,
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territorial structure has been altered by redrawing state boundaries to better cap-
ture the distribution of ethnic groups (Akinyele, 1996).
The second category of causes instead focuses on top-down mechanisms driv-
ing fragmentation, highlighting the political incentives of a survival-driven cen-
tral government. For example, in Vietnam, new provinces were created in order
to secure sufficient political support for previously untenable economic reforms
(Malesky, 2009). Resnick (2017) shows that incumbents in Ghana created addi-
tional units out of non-competitive districts to secure a larger share of legislative
seats in future elections. Evidence also suggests that central governments in some
cases, including Nigeria (Kraxberger, 2004) and Senegal (Resnick, 2014), have used
fragmentation as a “divide and rule” strategy, aiming to weaken the political oppo-
sition. An additional top-down explanation sees new units as a vehicle for main-
taining and expanding patronage networks. According to this logic, the creation of
a new administrative unit increases access to centrally distributed resources, spurs
local construction projects necessary for a functioning regional government, and
substantially increases the number of local government jobs. Green (2010) argues
that President Museveni relied on district splitting to fuel patronage in Uganda as
other sources of patronage dried up. Hassan (2016) presents evidence suggesting
that Kenyan leaders have exploited district creation as patronage as well, target-
ing unaligned ethnic minority groups. Hassan and Sheely (2017) argue that in the
context of lower level administration unit proliferation, there is unlikely a direct
neopatrimonial connection between the president and local actors because they are
too administratively distant. Instead, a neopatrimonial chain links local adminis-
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trators to legislators, and legislators to the executive.
Grossman and Lewis (2014) connect both bottom-up and top-down logics, ar-
guing that fragmentation is best understood as a function of both local demands
and political incentives from the vantage point of the central government. Accord-
ing to this reasoning, national elites are more likely to create additional subnational
units when they need to secure the support of politically, economically, and/or eth-
nically marginalized regions. In Uganda, for example, district councils were able
to express demand for a new district as long as a majority of councilors approved
the separation of one or more counties. However, these demands were sent up as
formal requests to the Ministry of Local Government and national parliament for
approval (Grossman and Lewis, 2014, p. 203).
While political scientists have been interested in why government fragmen-
tation occurs, economic theorists have long viewed smaller governing units as
positively related to economic performance. According to these classic perspec-
tives, the benefits from fragmentation may come from the information advantage
possessed by local government regarding local preferences relative to the central
government (e.g. Hayek, 1945), the creation of inter-jurisdictional competition that
allows citizens to ‘vote with their feet’ if unsatisfied with their local government
(e.g. Tiebout, 1956), or the efficiency gains from appropriately assigning taxation
and expenditure roles to different levels of government (e.g. Oates, 1972). From
this line of work, the most important constraint on the effectiveness of small ad-
ministrative units is their lack of economies of scale in service provision, tend favor
greater centralization (Oates, 1985). Political theorists dating to classical Greece
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have also generally found small units to be favorable, claiming that smaller units
empower a more robust democratic polity, with citizens better able to hold locally
elected officials accountable for government performance (see Faguet, 2012, ch. 5
for a review).
Though the theoretical arguments from economics regarding administrative
unit creation seem uniformly positive, the empirical consequences of fragmen-
tation remain understudied. In a recent review, Pierskalla (2016a, p. 24) argues
that this lack of clarity is due, at least in part, to both “a disparate and small set
of empirical studies” and a “dearth of strong research designs.” Nevertheless, a
limited set of recent work has shown the potential benefits of fragmentation. Us-
ing a border regression discontinuity design, Asher and Novosad (2015) find that
villages in newly created states in India experienced an improvement in night-
time light intensity and education outcomes. Grossman et al. (2017) show that
the provision of public goods depicts an inverted U-shaped relationship with a
measure of government fragmentation at the country level. Using geo-coded data
from Nigeria, Malawi, and Uganda, the authors also find improved healthcare
outcomes within regions that have been fragmented. To Grossman et al. (2017),
these results are attributable to the influx of capable leaders within newly created
units, increased competition between these leaders, and the incentives to target re-
sources toward new regional governments which were previously under-served.
However, these positive effects are tempered by excessive fragmentation, which
reduces economies of scale in the public goods provision and increases the likeli-
hood of local capture.
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This paper intends to contribute to this line of research by making a theoretical
departure motivated by the unique challenges faced by fragmenting governments
in certain parts of the developing world, particularly in Africa. Here, I argue that
the most important factor influencing public goods outcomes after fragmentation
stems from variation in administrative capacity across subnational governing units.
In the conclusion, I conjecture as to what contexts administrative capacity most
likely conditions the effects of fragmentation. The next section develops the mech-
anisms linking fragmentation to the challenges of administrative capacity and the
public goods provision.
3.2 Fragmentation, Administrative Capacity, & Public
Goods
Though factors like ethnic diversity (e.g. Habyarimana et al., 2007; Easterly and
Levine, 1997) and income inequality (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) may con-
dition social preferences for public goods and other development outcomes, soci-
ety’s preferences are unlikely translated into policy-outputs without a sufficiently
able government. To Ziblatt (p. 276 2008), local governments must be “capable of
implementing policy that might reflect social preferences.” Thus, a local govern-
ment’s capacity to implement policy is a fundamental determinate of the provision
of public goods.
The key contention of this paper is that government fragmentation restructures
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the distribution of administrative capacity across different types of subnational
units, which in turn results in heterogeneous public goods outcomes. To make
this claim clear, consider a stylized government fragmentation scenario in Figure
3.1. Prior to fragmentation, there are two units – A and B. Though subnational,
these units are not the lowest level of government and may thus be thought of as
provinces, states, or districts that preside over lower-level units like departments
or counties. After fragmentation, unit A retains its territorial extent and is therefore
denoted non-splitting. Following the language in Grossman and Lewis (2014), unit
B is fragmented into two units: the mother and the splinter. The mother – B′ –
retains some of its geography from the pre-fragmentation period, as well as the
administrative capital. The excess territory is therefore granted to the entirely new
splinter unit C.










Administrative capacity in the context of government fragmentation is largely
a function of two factors: 1) access to resources and 2) the quantity and quality
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of bureaucrats.2 Centeno et al. (2017) describe the importance of these factors as
well, though in the context of “state” and “organizational” capacity more gener-
ally, rather than in the context of subnational administrative unit creation.3 I argue
that these factors can be mapped onto the fragmentation types in Figure 3.1 to
show how administrative capacity likely varies across types from fragmentation
and how this variation results in heterogeneous public goods outcomes.
In order to provide public goods, administrative units must have access to suf-
ficient resources. To build and maintain roads, for example, an administrative unit
is required to, at a minimum, purchase materials and pay laborers. Access to re-
sources, however, is not equal across fragmentation types. This inequality stems
from the two ways in which units derive resources. First, units are often tasked
with collecting local revenue. Yet, across much of Africa, taxation is known to be
extremely difficult (Kasara, 2007). As administrative units become more periph-
eral, this difficulty becomes even greater. As noted by Grossman and Lewis (2014),
more often than not, splinter units are less developed and more rural than non-
splitting and mother units, implying that revenue collection will be especially dif-
ficult in splinter units. Thus, the relative local capacity to tax post-fragmentation
is A = B′ > C.
To Falleti (2005, p. 329), “...the delegation of taxing authority to subnational
units that lack the administrative capacity to collect new taxes can set serious con-
2Previous work on the local provision of public goods has documented the importance of these
two factors as well. For example, Ziblatt (2008) shows that resources and local staff experience were
the key variables driving health public goods outcomes in German cities in 1912.
3Centeno et al. (2017, p. 9-10) also describe ‘coherence’ and ‘the presence of the state’ as impor-
tant factors influencing capacity. Though important in general, these factors less clearly map onto
the present context and/or uniformly affect administrative capacity across all fragmentation types.
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straints on local budgets and increase the dependence of local officials on transfers
from the center.” Splinters therefore perhaps turn towards a second source of re-
sources – those distributed from the central government – to fund the provision of
public goods. Yet, access to centrally distributed resources is often the product of
intra-governmental bargaining between subnational units, the structure of which
is altered from fragmentation’s necessary change in territorial control. Grossman
and Lewis (2014, p. 202) argue that the bargaining leverage of any given adminis-
trative unit varies as a function of two factors. First, access to centrally distributed
resources increases with territorial size. In other words, larger units are in a privi-
leged position relative to smaller units to derive central funds.4 Second, as the total
number of subnational units increases, the sum bargaining power of all subna-
tional units falls relative to the central government because coordination becomes
more difficult. As described by Lewis (2014, p. 575), “the leverage of the many
newly split localities will be diminished relative to their former bargaining power
as a larger, single unit.”
Prior to fragmentation, the bargaining position and therefore access to centrally
distributed resources is A = B. However, post-fragmentation, the mother unit B′
loses some of its territorial extent, while A remains fully intact. Further, the splinter
unit C would have to coordinate with the mother unit B′ in order to retain the same
level of bargaining power as in the pre-fragmentation period under the unified
unit B. Ranking access to centrally distributed resources after fragmentation thus
4Lewis (2014, p. 575) asserts that it is an “uncontroversial assumption” that “...a local unit’s
bargaining power vis-a-vis the centre is increasing in its territorial size.”
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implies that A > B′ = C.
Administrative capacity also varies as a function of the quantity and quality
of the civil service and bureaucrats within each unit. Unlike non-splitting and
mother units, which both retain not only the capital city, but also staff from the
pre-fragmentation period, splinters must organize and staff entirely new regional
governments.5 Bardhan (2002, p. 189) aptly describes this issue in the context of
decentralization in developing countries, “...where the quality of staff in local bu-
reaucracies – including basic tasks like accounting and record keeping – is very
low. Even their more professional and technical people suffer from the disad-
vantages of isolation, poor training and low interaction with other professionals.”
Bardhan (2002, p. 190) notes further that this relative bureaucratic weakness likely
manifests most drastically in the provision of public goods and services that re-
quire “sophisticated expertise,” like “...power production and transmission, bulk
supply of clean water, and public sanitation.”
Existing work on fragmentation in Uganda has shown the validity of these con-
cerns, with new administrative units both severely understaffed and lacking suf-
ficient technical expertise necessary to effectively fill bureaucratic duties (Lewis,
2014). According to Nsamba (2009), of the total positions within the newly created
Ugandan districts in 2006, only 9 percent of positions were filled. Comparing the
quantity and quality of the civil service and bureaucracy across post-fragmentation
5While, in some cases, experienced civil servants may be transfered to the newly created units,
attenuating the effect of this mechanism. However, the tendency of well-experienced bureaucrats
to be placed in relatively pleasant regions minimizes this potential given that newly-created units
tend to be the most rural and underdeveloped in fragmenting countries (Grossman and Lewis,
2014).
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types, splinter units are at a clear disadvantage relative to their non-splitting and
mother counterparts, both of which retain their pre-fragmentation staff and exper-
tise. This implies that A = B′ > C when considering relative bureaucratic capacity
post-fragmentation.
3.2.1 Empirical expectations
This paper has argued that the provision of public goods will vary after govern-
ment fragmentation because administrative capacity across non-splitters, mothers,
and splinters will be significantly heterogeneous. This section specifies the key em-
pirical expectations that should follow by considering the relative ranking of each
fragmentation type after reform.
Splinter units are in the most limited position to tax relative to non-splitters
and mothers. At the same time, both splinters and mothers are in a weakened bar-
gaining position to access centrally distributed resources. Thus, when considering
the influence of resources on administrative capacity, the relative ranking across
fragmentation types is A > B′ > C. Factoring in variation in bureaucratic capacity
reinforces this ranking, with non-splitters and mothers both better equipped than
splinters, implying that the total ranking across fragmentation in terms of relative
administrative capacity is A > B′ > C. Thus, if government fragmentation re-
sults in heterogeneous public goods outcomes across fragmentation types because
of variation in administrative capacity, we should expect splinter units to experience a
lower provision of public goods relative to non-splitting and mother units after fragmenta-
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tion, while mother units will experience a lower provision of public goods relative only to
non-splitting units after fragmentation.
3.3 Fragmentation in Burkina Faso
To test the validity of this argument, this paper focuses on the case of Burkina
Faso. The political trajectory of Burkina mirrors that of several other African cases,
gaining independence from the French in 1960, followed by years of instability
and autocratic rule. Control of the state was seized by Blaise Compaoré in 1987
and he remained in power until being removed following a popular uprising in
2014, an era that spans the temporal scope of this paper. Like most former French
colonies in the region, political power was highly centralized until decentralization
reforms were pushed by the World Bank and the IMF as part of structural adjust-
ment programs in the 1990s (Englebert and Sangaré, 2014). There is little evidence
suggesting that local demands for administrative unit creation spurred fragmenta-
tion, as in Indonesia (Pierskalla, 2016b). In fact, the World Bank (p. 10 2002) found
that decisions regarding administrative unit creation were generally ad hoc, while
a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) commissioned as-
sessment claimed that Burkina undertook reform “Plainly, because donors wanted
it” (Englebert and Sangare, 2010, p. 17). Fragmentation in Burkina therefore ap-
pears to have been undertaken to show tangible evidence of decentralization re-
form.
The beginnings of the fragmentation period can be traced to the constitution
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adopted in 1991, which organized the country into local authorities (Article 143)
subject to local democratic competition (Article 145). In 1993, a series of laws for-
mally established the roles of subnational jurisdictions, though the territorial units
had been in place for several years. Provinces are the intermediary unit between re-
gions and departments. Served by a high commissioner appointed by the central
government, provinces supervise the administration of governance within their
borders (Dafflon and Madies, 2012, ch. 2). The government fragmentation laws
were passed in 1996, culminating in the addition of 15 new provinces, an increase
from the 30 prior (Englebert and Sangaré, 2014).6 Within each province sit several
departments. Unlike provinces, departments are served by both an elected official –
the mayor – as well as an appointed official – the prefect.7
Departments are legally responsible for the provision of public goods and ser-
vices across nearly every sector, including the management of electricity infrastruc-
ture, public lighting, wells, school construction, public hygiene, and land titling,
among many others (see p. 7-8 Englebert and Sangare, 2010, for additional respon-
sibilities). Departments adopt their own budgets in order to fulfill these respon-
sibilities. However, budgets are subject to approval by arms of the central gov-
ernment, including the Ministry of Decentralization and Territorial Control and
6Figure 3.8 in the Appendix displaying provincial boundaries before and and fragmentation,
differentiating between non-splitting, mother, and splinter provinces. Fragmentation types were
identified using the documentation provided in the Statoids project (Law, 2017). This information
was then used to create all shapefiles used throughout.
7More precisely, mayors serve the commune. However, communes and departments are territori-
ally the same. Generally, this governmental level is referred to as the department when referring to
the deconcentration of services and authority and the commune when referring to democratic de-
centralization. Since these terms refer to identical territories, I only refer to departments throughout
this paper.
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the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Moreover, appointed authorities, including
high commissioners at the provincial level, exercise substantial tutelage over de-
partmental decision-making, especially when these decisions are involve transfers
of financial resources from the central government (Englebert and Sangare, 2010).
As argued before, localities within splinter units are placed in a weakened bar-
gaining position when attempting to access centrally distributed funds relative to
non-splitting units. Descriptive evidence from Burkina supports this proposition,
with departments within splinter provinces receiving the most limited amount of
assistant from the center. Consider the transfers from the central government, de-
picted in Figure 3.2. The 45 provinces are split into 9 quantiles by total transfers
from the center between 2009 and 2014 – the years in which data were available.
These data were obtained directly from Burkina’s Ministry of Decentralization and
Territorial Administration. Though the causal identification would require data for
the years before and after fragmentation, this information is likely unobtainable.
Analysts within the Ministry indicated that many documents were lost in the arson
of multiple government buildings during the 2014 uprising. The same discussions
implied that if not lost from arson, this information may not have been formally
collected and maintained for the time period of interest. However, the available
data presents a clear pattern. As indicated by the large number of darkly shaded
provinces in the non-splitting map and the bar plot, most non-splitting provinces
are in the top quantiles of government transfers. Mother provinces are also mostly
in the top quantiles of transfers. However, all splinter provinces are in the bottom
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five quantiles of transfers, with most falling in the bottom 3.8
Figure 3.2: Access to financial resources, 2009-2014
Englebert and Sangaré (2014) note a similar pattern in 2008 with funds slated
specifically for decentralization. The 49 urban departments – most of which are
in non-splitting provinces – received 96 percent of external resources allocated
specifically for decentralization (loans and grants from international institutions),
while the 302 rural departments received only the leftover 4 percent.9 Figure 3.9
in the Appendix provides further evidence from province-level expenditures in
8When explaining access to central funds, separating the effects of bargaining power from pop-
ulation is inherently difficult. The effect of population on access to transfers, for example, may
operate through a bargaining mechanism. With this in mind, this discussion has avoided a strong
causal interpretation.
9Reports regarding subnational funding in Burkina often group spending statistics in terms of
rural versus urban departments, with some population threshold dictating this distinction. To my
knowledge, the specific funding patterns within departments are not publicly reported.
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2003 – the only year for which expenditures are available. Specifically, 14 of the 15
provinces with the lowest expenditures were fragmented, with the bottom 9 being
splinter provinces. Thus, though local governments were placed in the position
of de jure responsibility for the provision of public goods, unequal access to re-
sources suggests that the capacity to deliver these goods has likely been limited
for departments within splinter provinces.
Prior to fragmentation, bureaucratic capacity was severely limited country-
wide. According to Harsch (2017, ch. 5), as of 1987, for every 1,000 Burkinabe
citizens, there were only 3.5 civil servants, while in nearby Ghana, there were
over 22 civil servants per 1,000 citizens. After fragmentation, this weak bureau-
cracy was forced to stretch across a growing number of local governments. The
World Bank, for example, concluded in a review of Burkina’s reform that local
offices were upgraded to the provincial level, “...without their having the human
resources and skills required to actually manage these new offices” (World Bank,
2002, p. 10). Limited bureaucratic capacity was stretched the most thin in the splin-
ter provinces, likely because they were already more rural than their non-splitting
and mother counterparts. To Englebert and Sangare (2010, p. 15), a “lack of per-
manent salaried staff” has been a key cause of limited capacity at the local level
in rural areas of the country. This relative bureaucratic weakness seems to have
been well-known. The High Commissioner of the splinter province Kompienga in
eastern Burkina directly echoed this sentiment, stating that “...we obviously didn’t
have as much to begin with, but they expect us to catch up on our own.”10 The
10Interview conducted in June of 2017.
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problem is compounded by the fact that, according to Mahieu and Yilmaz (2010, p.
337), “...the small pool of qualified civil servants [in Burkina are] reluctant to accept
positions outside the capital or major urban centers.” Weak bureaucratic capacity
in many rural local communities became such a problem that by 2006, the govern-
ment adopted a decree to draw and retain quality staff to these units.11 However,
this decree appears to have been inaffective in acheiving these aims (Mahieu and
Yilmaz, 2010).
This section has described the context of fragmentation in Burkina, noting that
access to resources and bureaucratic capacity was most limited for localities falling
within splinter provinces. The next section develops a design to test whether these
limitations in fact influenced public goods outcomes as the theory predicts.
3.3.1 Research design
The proposed theoretical framework implies that province fragmentation should
have significantly heterogeneous effects on the provision of public goods across
fragmentation types. This expectation poses two methodological issues. First, the
fragmenting units – provinces – are not comparable before and after fragmenta-
tion since the units do not remain geographically intact. Following Grossman and
Lewis (2014), the unit of analysis is therefore scaled down to the department – one
level below the province. Thus, though each department remains fixed throughout
the entire sample period, the fragmentation status of the provinces under which
11LOI N◦ 027-2006/An portant régime juridique applicable aux emplois et aux agents des collec-
tivités territoriales.
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any given department lies may change.
Second, the theoretical expectations imply that by placing a department in a
counterfactual fragmentation type – that is, a fragmentation type that differs from
the department’s observed type – the resulting public goods outcome would have
differed. However, because of the fundamental problem of causal inference, it is
impossible to simultaneously observe a single unit in multiple treatment states
(Holland, 1986). To get around this issue, I use a difference-in-differences ap-
proach, which compares differences in public goods trends in departments across
non-splitting, mother, and splinter provinces before and after fragmentation (An-
grist and Pischke, 2008). The parameters of interest are estimated using the follow-
ing regression model:
Ydpt = γd + λt + δ(Mpt · dt) + ρ(Spt · dt) + X′dpt−1β + εdpt,
where the variable Spt takes the value of 1 in all department-years for departments
in splinter provinces and 0 for non-splitters and mothers, while Mpt is coded 1 only
for mother provinces. The pre-treatment and post-treatment period is indicated by
dt and is coded 0 for all observations prior to fragmentation and 1 thereafter. The
post-treatment period is modeled to begin in 1997, allowing for the fragmentation
law passed in 1996 to plausibly have an impact on the provision of public goods.
Department fixed effects are captured by γd, which eliminate any time-invariant
factors that may confound the effect of fragmentation reform on the public goods
provision. Importantly, the inclusion of unit-level fixed effects rules out many al-
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ternative explanations that do not vary throughout the sample period; several are
worth briefly noting. First, Hodler and Raschky (2014) argue that regional inequal-
ity is partly a function of favoritism to the birth region of a state’s leader. In this
case, Compaoré remained in office throughout the entire sample period and there-
fore regional favoritism towards his birth region cannot explain any variation un-
covered. Second, the distribution of ethnic groups in the country also remained
constant, thus eliminating ethnic favoritism as an alternative explanation (Alesina
et al., 2016). Third, potentially important geographic factors like terrain and land-
use are eliminated given their lack of variation over time (at least in the relatively
short-run). Finally, though the structure of party systems might influence pat-
terns and effects of decentralization (Riedl and Dickovick, 2014), this factor also
remained fixed with a single dominant party in power. Further, time fixed effects
are denoted by λt, thereby removing the effects of year-specific shocks that are
common to all departments, like the country-wide local elections in April of 2006.
In additional specifications, a linear time trend is also included and interacted with
the control variables described below.
3.3.2 Measuring public goods at the local level
This research design requires a measure of the public goods provision at the de-
partment level that spans the pre- and post-fragmentation period. A first option
may be to use the Demographic and Health Surveys, which provide geocoded re-
sponses to a battery of questions health and education outcomes as well as access
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to public services. Grossman et al. (2017) take this approach in their study of frag-
mentation’s affect on child and infant mortality in Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda.
Though this data may be the ideal option, it cannot be appropriately used to study
public good outcomes in Burkina at the department level. The DHS surveys are
designed to be representative at two levels: 1) the country and 2) the ‘DHS region.’
In most countries – including Burkina – the DHS region corresponds roughly to
the first administrative unit-level. The DHS region in this context is therefore one
level above the splitting units (provinces) and two levels above the unit of anal-
ysis (departments). Thus, while the geocoded DHS data provides specific coor-
dinates referring to sampling clusters that appear usable at very granular levels
of precision, these clusters were not designed to be used as such. The DHS even
cautions against this type of use, stating that analyses below the DHS region may
be “highly unreliable” and “are not representative of the population living at that
exact place.”12
With this constraint in mind, I therefore propose the average nighttime light in-
tensity as a reasonable proxy for the provision of public goods at the departmental
level. Lights is processed by the NOAA’s National Geophysical Data Center after
collection by the US Air Force Weather Agency (Version, 2014). The raw night-
time light intensity data comes as a high resolution spatial grid and runs from 0
to 63. Lights is aggregated by taking the mean grid-cell value in each department-
year. Prior to log-transforming, the average in the sample Lights is around 0.12,
12See dhsprogram.com/faq.cfm for details (accessed May 1, 2018).
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though the highest department-level mean in the sample is just over 33.13 Follow-
ing previous empirical studies (Hodler and Raschky, 2014; Alesina et al., 2016), I
add a small constant (0.001) to all Lights observations to avoid dropping zeros af-
ter log-transforming. Shown in Figure 3.10 in the Appendix, the distribution of
Lights improves after the log transformation, though the variable remains right-
skewed. Transforming Lights using the inverse hyperbolic sine, for which zero is
defined and therefore adding a constant is unnecessary, results in nearly identical
estimates.
For Lights to be an appropriate proxy for public goods, the measure should ex-
hibit two properties. First, it should correlate well with the ideal measures from
the DHS. To test this relationship, I first aggregate Lights to the first administrative
unit level, corresponding to the lowest level of appropriate subnational analysis
in the DHS data. I then combine DHS survey waves from 1993, 1999, 2003, 2010,
and 2014 and create four measures of public goods: 1) household electrification;
2) literacy; 3) child mortality; and 4) infant mortality. Each measure represents the
mean response within each DHS region. Figure 3.3 presents a series of linear re-
gressions in which Lights predicts each of these alternative public goods measures.
In all models, survey wave fixed effects are included to remove year-specific ef-
fects. Lights is positively related to household electrification and literacy, while
negatively associated with child and infant mortality. Further, these relationships
13Summary statistics appear in Table 3.1 in the Appendix. The relatively low levels of nighttime
light intensity, even in the most developed parts of the country, imply that top-coding (i.e. high
levels of intensity that actually vary get lumped into the top value of the scale) is unproblematic.
Further, because I use the “stable” version of the nighttime light intensity data, “unstable” sources
of light unrelated to the provision of public goods like gas flares or forest fires are removed.
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are all statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Taken together, this exercise sug-
gests that Lights is a relatively reasonable proxy for the provision of public goods
at the local level in Burkina Faso.
Figure 3.3: The relationship between Lights and alternative measures of public
goods at the region-level
Note: all models include year fixed effects. Lights is logged. Error bars denote 95 percent confidence
intervals.
Second, the provision of electricity must also plausibly arise as a function of
subnational governance. Widespread electrification is generally dependent on gov-
ernment activity (Min, 2015). This is particularly true in Burkina, with the state-
owned National Company of Electricity primarily responsible for the supply and
distribution of electricity throughout the country Ouédraogo (2010). However, as
described earlier, local governments are responsible for devising their own bud-
get and development plans. Several factors related to nighttime light intensity are
under the umbrella of local government responsibility, including the creation and
management of energy infrastructure, public lighting, and participation in the de-
sign of regional electric networks (p. 8 Englebert and Sangare, 2010). The ability
of departments to improve their provision of electricity remains conditional on in-
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put from the central government, with development plans and budgets subject to
state approval. The provision of electricity is therefore the result of an interaction
between local planning and budgeting and the prerogative of the central govern-
ment. In this context, bureaucratic capacity and ability to lobby for access to state
resources are especially important, implying that nighttime light intensity repre-
sents a particularly appropriate measure of public goods as a test for the proposed
theory.
3.3.3 Control variables
Two time-varying department-level controls are captured by X′pt−1. First, as a
landlocked country in the Sahel, economic production in Burkina is sensitive to
climactic variation. Thus, I introduce Drought Index, which controls for variation
in rainfall across departments. This variable is derived from the Standardized Pre-
cipitation and Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI) (Beguerı́a et al., 2014) and indicates
the proportion of a year for which a department experienced drought. Originally
represented by a 0.05x0.05 decimal degree spatial grid, the SPEI data is aggre-
gated to the department level by taking the mean value grid-cell value within
each department. Since domestic energy production in Burkina is dependent on
hydro-electrical sources (Ouédraogo, 2010), drought is expected to correlate neg-
atively with Lights. Second, logged Population Density enters the model to ensure
that variation in mean nighttime light intensity is not simply due to population
changes. Population estimates come form the Gridded Population of the World
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(GPW) project (GPW, 2005). Estimates are available every five years beginning in
1990. This data limitation requires the filling of population estimates for years in
which there was no dedicated estimation. For example, years 1995 through 1999
employ the population estimate from 1995, while years 2000 through 2004 use the
estimates from 2000. Population Density is aggregated to the department level by
taking the average grid-cell population density per department. Both controls are
lagged 1 year to avoid post-treatment bias.
3.4 Results
Figure 3.4 depicts the variation in Lights across fragmentation types. Prior to frag-
mentation, the average nighttime light intensity in departments within non-splitting
provinces was higher than that for Mother and Splinter provinces. After fragmen-
tation, Lights continued along an upward trajectory for non-splitters, while Mother
and Splinter provinces appear to experience significant stagnation. Moreover, av-
erage nighttime light intensity in departments within Splinter provinces worsened
for several years after fragmentation. Splinters therefore appear descriptively the
most worse-off from fragmentation.
Table 3.2 presents the primary regression estimates, while Figure 3.5a plots the
difference-in-difference estimates for Mothers and Splinters using the entire sample
period (1992-2013).14 All models include standard errors clustered by province,
14Following Kastellec and Leoni (2007), I rely on coefficient plots of the causal variables for inter-
pretation.
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Figure 3.4: Average nightlights over time and by province fragmentation type
the highest level of aggregation (Cameron and Miller, 2015).15 The estimates can
be interpreted relative to the omitted category of non-splitting provinces. When
omitting time-varying controls, both Mothers and Splinters present negative and
statistically significant estimates. Introducing controls for Population and Drought
Index slightly increases the size of each estimate. In the final model, a linear time
trend is interacted with each time-varying control. Mother remains negative and of
similar size, but is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels. Splinter,
on the other hand, remains negative and highly statistically significant.
The estimates in Figure 3.5a suggest departments within mother provinces ex-
perienced between 21.82 and 26.15 percent less nighttime light intensity on aver-
age because of fragmentation.16 However, this negative impact should be treated
15Models are estimated using the PLM package in R. All standard errors are also
heteroscedasticity-consistent (i.e. “robust”) and follow an “HC1” degrees of freedom adjustment.
16The semi-logarithmic setup of each regression with dummy independent variables necessitates
care in interpreting the impact of Mother and Splinter on Lights. Following Giles et al. (2011), these
estimates are converted to percentage impacts by using 100(exp(c − 12 v(c)) − 1), where c is the
estimated coefficient and v is the estimated variance (i.e. the square of the standard error).
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Figure 3.5: The effect of province fragmentation on Lights
(a) 1992-2013 (b) 1992-2001
Note: all models include department and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by province.
Error bars around estimates denote 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. Time-varying controls
include Population Density and Drought Index. Controls-trend interacts time-varying controls with
time trend.
with caution due to variation in standard errors across specifications. On the other
hand, departments within splinter provinces are clearly substantively and statis-
tically worse-off, experiencing on average between 31.13 and 36.46 percent less
nighttime light intensity because of fragmentation.
3.4.1 Restricting the sample period
One empirical challenge to the primary results described thus far may be that the
uneven distribution of time periods before and after reform are driving the esti-
mates. The following estimates subset the sample to include only 1992 to 2001. By
moving the end of the sample period closer to the date of fragmentation, we can
more plausibly ensure that unmeasured factors not captured in the fixed effects or
time trend are not confounding the results.
Shown in Figure 3.5b, Mother is consistently negative, though is never distin-
108
guishable from zero across specifications. The estimates for Splinter, when either
omitting or including time-varying controls, remain negative and statistically sig-
nificant at the 0.05 level. When interacting a linear time trend with the control
variables, the estimate diminishes in size slightly and becomes significant at the
0.1 level, though the 95 percent confidence interval just barely crosses zero. Sub-
stantively, departments within splinter provinces experienced between 25.09 and
20.19 percent less nighttime light intensity on average from fragmentation until
2001. These results largely confirm that the public goods disparity between splin-
ter provinces and non-splitters worsened due to fragmentation.
3.4.2 Parallel trends and endogenous selection
Another empirical issue may be that the identification assumptions required for
plausible difference-in-differences estimates are not met. Namely, identifying the
effects of fragmentation in this framework relies on the parallel trends assumption,
which states that prior to fragmentation, trends in nighttime light intensity were
similar across fragmentation types, but fragmentation in 1996 prompted deviation
from this common trend (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, ch. 5). Crucially, this assump-
tion does not require similarity in levels of nighttime lights across fragmentation
types prior to reform, but only similar changes over time. Conditioning on de-
partment fixed effects increases the plausibility of this assumption. Further, as
shown in Figure 3.4, though mothers and splinters start below non-splitters, the
yearly changes prior to fragmentation are similar. For example, between 1992 and
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1993, all three types saw increased nighttime light intensity, while lights decreased
slightly for all types between 1993 and 1994.
Parallel trends can be inspected more directly by interacting each fragmenta-
tion type with yearly indicators (Autor, 2003). If the effect of fragmentation is
statistically significant prior to reform, the parallel trends assumption may be in
question and we can surmise that unmeasured differences across fragmentation
types unrelated to fragmentation are confounding the results. Said otherwise, de-
partments that were already going to experience a significantly worse trend after
1996 may have endogenously selected into splinters, while those that were going
to experience slightly worse trends selected into mothers, and those that were go-
ing to experience a significant improvement selected into non-splitters. However,
if there is no effect prior to fragmentation, yet the effect after remains, we can be
confident in the plausibility of parallel trends.
Figure 3.6 presents the results from this exercise, relying on the most conser-
vative modeling strategy, which includes time-varying controls interacted with a
linear time trend, as well as department and year fixed effects. As shown in the
first panel, the effect of Mother is only statistically significant in one of the pre-
fragmentation years. After fragmentation, Mother is not consistently statistically
significant. Prior to fragmentation, Splinter is never distinguishable from zero, in-
dicating that these departments were not significantly different than non-splitters
before reform. However, beginning one year after fragmentation, Splinter is nega-
tive and statistically significant for several years in a row, with most substantively
severe effects appearing between 2001 and 2010. Thus, the negative effect of falling
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within a splinter province is unlikely related to pre-reform differences.
Figure 3.6: The effect of province fragmentation over time
Note: this model includes department and year fixed effects as well as time-varying controls for Pop-
ulation and Drought Index interacted with linear time-trend. Standard errors clustered by province.
Error bars around estimates denote 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals. The vertical bar indi-
cates province fragmentation in 1996.
3.4.3 Influential departments
As a final empirical check, Figure 3.7 presents the distribution of estimates when
iteratively excluding one department per regression, therefore examining the po-
tential that changes in nighttime light intensity within one department over time
are driving the results. This ensure that the departments with relatively significant
nighttime light intensity, like those that the house majors cities of Ouagadougou
(the capital) or Bobo-Dioulasso are not overly-influential in generating the effects.
This exercise involves estimating 350 individual regressions (the total number of
departments minus 1). All models include controls for both population density
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and drought as well as their interactions with a linear time trend to ensure the
most stringent test is used. I plot the distribution of t-statistics in order to summa-
rize both coefficients and their variance simultaneously.
Shown in the first panel, the t-statistics for Splinter are all between -2.0 and -
3.0, indicating that this coefficient is always statistically significant at the 0.05 level
or better for each iteration. When sub-setting to only 1992-2001, the density of
t-statistics for Splinter remains just below -2.0 and all iterations are above -1.68,
implying consistent statistical signficance at least at the 0.10 level. Thus, the pri-
mary result of this paper – that departments within Splinter provinces experienced
a lower provision of public goods after fragmentation – appears unattributable to
the influence of any one department.
3.5 Alternative explanations
The previous tests have ruled out several empirical challenges to the core argu-
ment in this paper. Considering the reviewed literature on the motivations of
fragmentation, a few alternative explanations must be addressed. First, several
perspectives rooted in economic theory imply that the provision of public goods
should improve as units become smaller (e.g. Hayek, 1945; Tiebout, 1956; Oates,
1972). If important here, departments within the newly shrunken units – mothers
and splinters – should have experience improved public goods outcomes relative
to non-splitters after fragmentation. However, all empirical tests are explicitly con-
trary to this expectation.
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of estimates when iteratively excluding departments
Note: the density plots present the results of 350 regressions, each of which excludes one depart-
ment. All models include department and year fixed effects as well as time-varying controls for
Population and Drought Index interacted with a linear time-trend. Standard errors are clustered by
province.
Second, recent work has shown that political elites often leverage the creation
of new units as a vehicle for maintaining and expanding patronage networks (see
Green (2010) and Hassan (2016); Hassan and Sheely (2017) for examples in Uganda
and Kenya, respectively). As described before, fragmentation decisions in Burk-
ina did not appear to follow a distinct political logic of this sort and were instead
fairly “ad hoc” (p. 10 World Bank, 2002). Though subnational patterns of political
support may allow for a systematic evaluation of whether unit creation followed
patrimonial patterns found in other cases, this data is not available. Moreover, a
general lack of institutionalized political competition likely prohibits the useful-
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ness of most standard measures of subnational political support.17 Nonetheless,
the implications of the patronage perspective may be evaluated indirectly given
the evidence presented in this paper. According to this logic, newly created units
pull in centrally distributed funds and spur local construction projects necessary
for a functioning regional government, in turn, creating a sizable number of local
government jobs which can be distributed to political supporters. If the patronage
logic were plausible, splinter units should have experienced the largest influx of re-
sources and jobs. Across all tests, however, splinters were shown to experience the
poorest trend in the provision of public goods after fragmentation. Further, splin-
ters appear to pull in the least amount of centrally distributed resources, while
non-splitters and mothers pull in the most (see Figures 3.2 and 3.9).
A final argument suggests that, in certain cases, local demands for ethnically
homogeneous units spur government fragmentation (see Pierskalla (2016b) and
Akinyele (1996) for examples in Indonesia and Nigeria, respectively). If this logic is
valid, units may have been made more homogeneous, which in turn may improve
the provision of public goods (see Habyarimana et al., 2007, for the relationship
between ethnic diversity and public goods). While there is little evidence suggest-
ing that local demands structured fragmentation in Burkina in this way, concerns
of this potentially confounding pathway may be assuaged by considering a few
factors. Most simply, political competition is generally not mobilized along ethnic
lines in Burkina. For example, taking Posner’s (2004) Politically Relevant Ethnic
17For example, in the presidential election in 1991, official numbers stated that Compaorè won
86.42 percent of all votes and 100.00 percent of all “valid” votes. In the National Assembly election
of 1997, the year immediately following fragmentation, Compaorè’s Congress for Democracy and
Progress (CDP) won 91 percent of the 111 total seats.
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Groups (PREG) measure, for example, Burkina is tied for the least ethnically frac-
tionalized country in Africa (PREG of 0.00). Similarly, the Ethnic Power Relations
geocoded release (geoEPR) excludes Burkina because of ethnicity’s lack of political
relevance within the country (Wucherpfennig et al., 2011).
Additionally, geographic variation in ethnicity poorly predicts which depart-
ments were subject to which types of splitting. Figure 3.11 in the Appendix dis-
plays density plots for each of Burkina’s primary ethnic groups, with the propor-
tion of a given department’s population that identifies with each ethnic group
depicted on the horizontal axis. These densities are further differentiated along
the vertical axis by whether a departments was a non-splitter, mother, or splin-
ter. Each proportion is derived from the Spatially Interpolated Data on Ethnic-
ity (SIDE) dataset from Schweinitz and Hunziker (2018).18 Note that for nearly
all ethnic groups, the proportion densities are very similar, regardless of the split
type. For one group – the Mossi – there is a larger density of high proportions
for non-splitters relative to mothers and splinters. However, even a simple multi-
nomial logit, controlling only for population, suggests that this variation is not a
statistically meaningful determinant of fragmentation.19 Finally, by including de-
18As outlined before, DHS geocoded data cannot be used appropriately alone at the department
level in Burkina. However, Schweinitz and Hunziker (2018) develop a machine learning approach
to interpolate the information provided regarding ethnic identification in a country’s limited num-
ber of geocoded DHS clusters continuously across space. Interpolation of this sort may offer bene-
fits in exploring variation in other DHS indicators of public goods, though adapting their machine
learning approach to this context is beyond the scope of this paper.
19In this multinomial logit, the dependent variable is Split Type, which can either be non-splitting,
mother, or splinter. The primary independent variable is the proportion of each department’s pop-
ulation that identifies as Mossi, while population density enters as a control variable. With standard
errors clustered by province, the 95 percent confidence interval for the logit coefficient on Proportion
Mossi for the probability that a department is a mother relative to a non-splitter is (-6.50, 0.30); for
the probability that a department is a splinter relative to a non-splitter, the 95 percent confidence
interval is Proportion Mossi is (-6.74, 0.74).
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partment fixed effects, the research design bluntly controls for baseline variation
in ethnic diversity at the unit level. As long as there is not significant ethnic migra-
tion across departments before and after fragmentation, department-level ethnic
diversity cannot be a plausible alternative explanation.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that communities within splinter units in Burkina Faso ex-
perienced a worsened provision of public goods from government fragmentation
relative to non-splitting units, while the units used to create the new units were
only partially negatively affected. The theoretical framework put forth explains
this finding as arising from variation in administrative capacity across splinter,
mother, and non-splitting units. In short, communities splintered into new units
are in a weaker position to tax, access centrally distributed resources, and have a
more limited bureaucracy than others. These findings resonate with the perspec-
tive that fragmentation has distributional consequences (Grossman et al., 2017).
However, this paper argues that these consequences can be perverse, limiting the
provision of public goods in the communities most affected by fragmentation rel-
ative to those least affected.
Though I have provided evidence from only Burkina Faso, the importance of
administrative capacity in producing heterogeneous public goods outcomes after
fragmentation likely travels in predictable ways. Administrative capacity through-
out Burkina, for example, was severely limited both before and after fragmentation
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(Harsch, 2017). As baseline administrative capacity increases within a reforming
country, the likelihood that fragmentation will substantially affect administrative
capacity likely decreases. Future work should therefore explore how baseline ad-
ministrative capacity influences the consequences of fragmentation on the provi-
sion of public goods.
Burkina Faso also had very little experience with subnational governance prior
to fragmentation. In other cases, perhaps especially those with links to indirect
rule under the British colonial system, decentralized governance and local polit-
ical competition may have a stronger precedent. In these contexts, variation in
administrative capacity within the fragmenting government may be less impor-
tant, while mechanisms rooted in altered political competition like those proposed
by Grossman et al. (2017) may be more probable. Interestingly, these authors show
that individuals within splinter units experience improved public health outcomes
after fragmentation in Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda, all countries which have his-
torical links to indirect rule under the British colonial system. Moreover, in cases
in which demands for administrative unit creation came from below – as in the
case of Indonesia (Pierskalla, 2016b) – fragmentation may less likely result in ad-
ministratively weak units. Additional work should explore how the historical and
political origins of administrative capacity structure the effects of fragmentation.
The primary limitations of this study come from data unavailability. In partic-
ular, I am only able to evaluate the causal effect of fragmentation on the provision
of one public good – electricity. At the same time, I have taken care to show that 1)
electricity is a reasonable proxy for the provision of other public goods; and 2) the
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theoretical mechanisms developed plausibly produce variation in electricity. Sim-
ilarly, quality data on public employment and government transfers that would
be useful as a direct test of mechanisms is generally not available. Instead, I re-
lied on all data made available through meetings with analysts within Burkinabé
ministries and qualitative assessments conducted by others to substantiate the the-
oretical argument. The contributions of focusing on Burkina Faso, even given the
data constraints partly unique to the country, outweigh the costs leaving it criti-
cally understudied (Briggs, 2017).
To conclude, this paper may be read as a cautionary tale for policymakers seek-
ing to improve governance in the developing world through decentralization re-
form. In particular, “progress on decentralization” should not be “equated with
the number of subnational governments” (Resnick, 2017, p. 48). Instead, govern-
ment fragmentation should be perceived with an eye towards context. Specifically,
policymakers should ask whether newly created units possess the capacity to ful-
fill the duties of an effective subnational government. Without such administrative




Figure 3.8: Provinces in Burkina Faso
(a) Pre-Fragmentation (b) Post-Fragmentation
Note: Map 3.8a shows the 30 provinces in Burkina Faso prior to government fragmentation, while
Map 3.8b shows the provinces updated borders after fragmentation, which resulted in 45 total
provinces. The shading in Map 3.8b differentiates between non-splitting, mother, and splinter
provinces.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Lights 7,722 0.119 1.219 0.000 33.271
log(Lights) 7,722 −5.991 2.024 −6.908 3.505
Mother 7,722 0.214 0.410 0 1
Splinter 7,722 0.196 0.397 0 1
log(Population Density) 7,722 3.737 0.749 0.850 8.194
Drought Index 7,722 0.046 0.044 0.000 0.333























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.9: Province expenditure: 2003
Figure 3.10: Density plots: Lights
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Figure 3.11: Proportion of ethnic group (1993) within a department and split type
122
Conclusion
While international development projects, policies, and reforms often stem from
the top-down, the political and economic consequences of these decisions fall on
citizens on the ground. To understand these consequences, I began with a theo-
retical and empirical approach for estimating citizen preferences among different
types of foreign aid projects in Chapter 1. I showed that though citizens have
distinct preferences for different types of aid, the Ugandan government appears
to target projects divorced from these preferences. In Chapter 2, I presented evi-
dence that internal displacement in Northern Uganda – a decision prioritized by
the Ugandan government and supported by donors – altered the targeting of vote
buying post-conflict. In Chapter 3, I estimated the consequences of government
fragmentation on the provision of public goods in Burkina Faso at the local level.
This reform, which was prioritized by international donors and implemented by
the Burkinabe government, resulted in worse public goods outcomes for many
communities. This concluding chapter considers some key lessons and implica-
tions from this dissertation and notes potential directions for future work.
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The view of aid from below
Citizens within aid-receiving countries are the supposed beneficiaries of foreign
aid, yet researchers rarely consult them directly. Instead, the vast majority of
studies focus on the distribution and effectiveness of aid at the country (see Qian
(2015) for a review) or at the subnational levels (e.g. Jablonski, 2014; Briggs, 2014).
Though these approaches have been fruitful in their own right, they necessarily fall
short of understanding the perceptions and preferences of citizens on the ground.
In Chapter 1, I offered a theoretical and empirical approach for directly consult-
ing citizens on foreign aid. In doing so, I showed that citizens in Northern Uganda
have clear preferences for certain types of aid rather than others. Project type is by
far the most important factor driving citizen preferences, a possibility that has been
understated in previous work on aid at the individual level (Findley et al., 2017a).
Citizens particularly prefer social development projects like healthcare and edu-
cation relative to investment in infrastructure like roads and electrification. The
robust preference for social development relative to large infrastructure speaks to
existing work at more aggregate levels, which notes that infrastructure projects are
more often subject to corruption and failure (i.e. Winters and Martinez, 2015).
I also showed that a common narrative regarding African aid – that Chinese
projects are uniquely corruptable (e.g. Dreher et al., 2016; Isaksson and Kotsadam,
2018) – may be overstated, at least from the perspective of average citizens. North-
ern Ugandans only slightly preferred traditional donors like the World Bank and
European Union to Chinese projects. Moreover, preferences for Chinese projects
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are very similar to preferences for projects from other non-Western donors like
Japan, suggesting that citizens unlikely view Chinese aid as especially corruptable.
20
Though citizens do have distinct preferences, the Ugandan government does
not appear to take these preferences very seriously. Most strikingly, the govern-
ment has substantially over-provided roads projects from Western donors relative
to citizen demand. This pattern suggests that a model of subnational aid distribu-
tion that hinges on electoral returns – like that from Jablonski (2014) in Kenya –
unlikely holds in Uganda, at least a version in which politicians respond to voter
preferences. A model of aid distribution that considers elite-level political returns
may instead be more relevant in this context. For example, the over-provision of
roads may come from increased opportunities for elite corruption (Winters and
Martinez, 2015) or from the fact that these projects are highly visible and therefore
represent tangible progress on development attributable to incumbent politicians
(Harding, 2015).
Context and consequences
Several important implications in this dissertation come from focusing on under-
explored political and institutional contexts. The mismatch between citizen pref-
erences for aid and the behavior of the government presented in Chapter 1, for
example, may be due in part to limited democratic institutions in Uganda. While
20See Blair and Roessler (2018) for another recent example challenging the “rogue Chinese aid”
narrative.
125
the voters in this context do hold some political power, especially in the North,
where voters overwhelmingly challenge the ruling party, the NRM has controlled
the state for several decades. In contexts where the central government is more
fully accountable to electoral pressures, we might expect the provision of aid to
more closely match the preferences of average citizens. While beyond the scope of
this dissertation, this is an important empirical question that follows from the for-
mal model specified in Chapter 1, which assumes that the government is indeed
accountable to their voters. Future work should explore the degree to which elec-
toral constraints condition the match between citizen preferences for aid and the
government’s behavior.
In Chapter 2, I argued that the twin contextual factors of clientelistic political
competition and informal land tenure produced a shift in the targeting of vote
buying following the LRA insurgency. The context-specific nature of this argu-
ment again has comparative implications. We shouldn’t expect IDPs in a country
like Ukraine, for example, to be increasingly targeted with vote buying upon their
return home because the land tenure system in this country is formal. By contrast,
when conflict finally wanes in countries with informal land tenure systems like
South Sudan, Yemen, and Colombia, we will likely observe a shift in the targeting
of vote buying. Policymakers interested in democratic governance post-conflict
should therefore consider a potential influx in clientelism in these contexts.
The negative economic consequences for newly-created administrative units in
Burkina Faso presented in Chapter 3 were due in large part to the context of very
weak administrative capacity, with these units lacking the basic funding and bu-
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reaucracy necessary to fulfill the provision of public goods. Moreover, unlike con-
texts like Indonesia, where bottom-up pressures led the government to fragment
(Pierskalla, 2016b), fragmentation in Burkina was imposed from above by the cen-
tral government in response to international pressures for progress on decentral-
ization. Fragmentation in Burkina was therefore not demand-driven, suggesting
that like Northern Uganda, there was a mismatch between the citizen demand
government decision-making. Though only one example, this case suggests that
ineffective development policies may follow from a mismatch between decisions
from above and citizen demand.
Decisions from above, consequences on the ground
This dissertation has shown how decisions made by governments and interna-
tional organizations impact average citizens and communities on the ground. Though
less common than more aggregate approaches, a turn to granular levels of analysis
is often necessary because many unintended consequences of international devel-
opment are unobservable from above.
For example, if analyzed at the country-level, administrative unit creation in
Burkina may look successful, with the overall provision of public goods improv-
ing since fragmentation. Yet this aggregate improvement masks substantial het-
erogeneity within the country, with the positive effects largely due to the subset of
non-fragmenting communities. Similarly, though foreign aid decisions are made
well above average citizens, understanding citizen preferences tells us something
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about the motivations of the government. In Northern Uganda, for example, the
mismatch between citizen preferences and the government’s behavior suggests
that the government is unlikely motivated by electoral pressures to respond to
voter preferences.
While valuable for understanding the politics and economic consequences of
development on the ground, this approach comes with important challenges. First,
micro-level data in Africa are scarce, especially in post-conflict settings like North-
ern Uganda and under-studied countries like Burkina Faso. Though there are some
publicly available geo-coded surveys, as described in Chapter 3, these sources are
generally not fit for use at local levels. Second, measuring citizen preferences,
voter experiences, and community-level development outcomes is exceedingly
complex. Considering just the examples in this dissertation, aid projects are mul-
tidimensional, vote buying is illegal and socially undesirable, and the relationship
between government fragmentation and the provision of public goods is rife with
confounding and selection bias.
To address these challenges, I collected original data from a single context (North-
ern Uganda), relied on an innovative data source for a single public good (night-
time light intensity and electrification), and developed innovative experimental
and observational research designs uniquely suited to address the problems for
each question. In contrast to more common approaches, which rely on off-the-
shelf data and research designs, these tailored approaches necessarily limited the
empirical scope of each chapter. However, an understanding of the consequences
of international development for the intended beneficiaries requires an embrace
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of this limitation. Scholars and funders should similarly embrace this limitation,
prioritizing tailored research designs and data collection efforts to make progress
on understanding the consequences of international development on the ground.
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